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We ordinarily think that physical objects persist
thi'ough changes in their parts.

The ordinary view has been

challenged by some philosophers.

In Chapter I,

several ar-

guments in support of this challenge are formulated and
shov/n to be defective.

The Problem of the Ship of Theseus,

which has served as a focus for discussion of the difficulties inherent in the ordinary

viev;,

is presented in an

effort to understand the motivation behind the attempts of
some philosophers to provide alternative accounts of per-

sistence

.

One such philosopher is John Locke.
a

treatment of Locke's theory of persistence.

Chapter II is
It is argued

that the viev; most commonly attributed to Locke, namely that

identity is relative, is inconsistent with his ontological

V

presuppositions.

A physical object is construed as a set

of successive masses of matter each member of which shares

with the others a certain "organizational" property.

Or-

ganizational properties are explained in terms of Locke's
concept of a nominal essence.

While this seems to be the

best interpretation of Locke, it is argued both that the
theory fails to provide

a

satisfactory account of persis-

tence and that its central concepts defy conherent formulation

.

Chapter III is devoted to a critical analysis of

Chisholm's theory of persistence.

According to Chisholm,

physical objects are logical constructions upon "composita"
or "genuine wholes" of which mereological essentialism is
true.

Chisholm's attempts to define the relations of "evo-

lution," "succession" and "constitution" are shown to he

defective.

Thus, he has not succeeded in providing an ac-

count of v/hat he calls "loose and popular identity."
The apparent failure of alternative accounts of per-

sistence provides a motivation for reconsidering the status
of the ordinary view.

In Chapter IV,

the ordinary view is

formulated in a way that initially appears to render it immune to the difficulties raised by the Problem of the Ship
of Theseus.

view rests on

Finally, however, it is shov/n that the ordinary
a

serious confusion that seems to have gone
VI

unnoticed.

Unfortunately, the two alternatives thus far

proposed are subject to the same difficulty.

Xf so, we may

be forced to reevaluate not only our views about persistence

but also about the ontological status of physical objects.

VI
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CHAPTER

I

SOME ARGUMENTS AGAINST PERSISTENCE
1.

Unsuccessful Attempts to Undermine
the Ordinary View

The ordinary view

.

If my car came into existence somewhere

in Sweden five years ago and will cease to exist someday,

somewhere, then it has persisted from the former time until

now and will persist from now until the latter time.

Since

my car has lost and gained many parts during the time that
it has existed,

parts.

it has persisted through changes in its

Until we are given reason to think ocherwise, it is

reasonable to assume that when we say, for instance, that
the car in my driveway now is the one

I

drove to California

last summer, we are using the 'is' of strict identity.

The

expression 'the car in my drivev;ay now' refers to the very
same thing to which the expression 'the car

fornia last summer' refers.

I

In what follows,

drove to Caliwill dis-

I

cuss various arguments that purport to show that there are

indeed reasons to think otherwise.

We will see whether any

of these arguments is coercive.
Le ibniz'

law argument against the ordinary view

.

To say

that the 'is' in a sentence such as "the car in my driveway

now is the car

I

drove to California last summer" is the
1

2

is

of strict identity is to say that v;hatever is true of

the referent of 'the car in my driveway now'

referent of

the car

is true of the

drove to California last summer.

I

Strict identity is an equivalence relation that is governed
by Leibniz'

(LL)

Law:

(x) (y)

[x=y iff

(F) (Fx s Fy)

But the car in my driveway now, it might be argued, has

parts the car

vice versa.
a

muffler.

I

drove to California last summer lac}:s, and

The car

drove to California last summer had

I

The car in my driveway now lacks a muffler.

The car in my driveway now has snow tires.
to California last summer did not.

The car

drove

Thus, it seems, there

are properties had by one not had by the other.
to

I

According

then, they are not identical.

(LL)

This line of reasoning is supported by Hume, who
says,

"
'

tis plain that we must attribute a perfect identity

to this provided all the parts contiriue uninterruptedly and

invariably the same

.

.

.

But supposing some very small or

inconsiderable part be added to the mass, or subtracted
from it
v;hole,

.

.

.

this absolutely destroys the identity of the

strictly speaking."^

This suggests the follov/ing

reductio of the view that some things persist through
changes in their parts:
(Al)

(1)

Some physical objects persist through changes
in their parts.

3

(2)

If

then

(1),

(“^x)

(3y)

Ot)

Of)

(^Ip)

(xhasp

as a part at t and y lacks
p as a part at t'
t
(

(3)

If

'

>

t)

and X - y

(3x) (3y) (3t)

)

(3f)

(3p)

has p as a part

(X

at t and y lacks p as a part at

then Ox) (3y) (3t) (3f
y lacks F at
(^)
(5)

(x) (y)

(x=y

f

(f

)

e

Fy)

(f

>

t)

,

has F at t and

(x

and x =

t)

>

(Fx

(F)

OF)

f
y)

.

.

No physical object persists through changes in
its parts.

(Al)

appears reasonably straightforward.

If we suppose that

an object can persist through a change of parts, then it has

at one time a part that it lacks at another.
as one time a part that it lacks at another,

property (namely, having that part as
at another.

But this, it seemis

,

a part)

contradicts

And if it has
then it has a

that it lacks
(LL)

,

v;hich

tells us that identical things share all their properties.

Three replies to the Leibniz' law argument
ever, three alternatives to accepting (Al)
vol^7^es

a

slight adjustment in

(IjL)

.

.

There are, howThe first in-

If we think that change

should be explained in terms of an object gaining and losing

properties, then our concept of identity should allow that
an object a existing at one time is identical to an object b

existing at another time, though
and b another set of properties.

a has

one set of properties

However, considered at one

4

time, a and b must share their properties if they
are

identical.
(LL')

Thus, LL becomes:

(x) (y)

If we take

[x=y iff

(LL')

(t)(F)(Fx,t

'

(x) (y)

)

Fy,t)]

as the correct explication of our concept

of identity, then Premise
(4

E

[x=y

(4)

(F) (t)

of

(Fxt

(Al)

E

becomes:

Fyt)

But then, no contradiction results, for the preceding

premises do nothing to show that an object that changes

a

part has properties at one time that it lacks at the very
same time.

Another alternative is to view objects that persist
as possessing dated properties.

Thus, rather than saying

that my car has the property of being green simpliciter, we
say that it has the property of being green on July 24,
1974.
(3)

Turning to (Al)

we see that, in this view. Premise

If an object a has p as a part at t

is false.

it has the property of having p as a part at t
2

»

,

then

If it

loses p at t^, then it lacks the property of having p as a

part at

t

But it lacks that property at t^ as

*

2

Similarly, at
at

tj^.

So,

t

2

/

a has the

v;ell.

property of having p as a part

from the fact that an object has at one time a

part it lacks at another, it does not follow that it has

properties at one time that it lacks at another.

To say

5

that an object changes, then, is to say that it has the

property F at t, and lacks the property F at t', though it
has and lacks these properties respectively throughout the

time that it exists.

If we consider objects that persist

as possessing dated properties such as these, then we avoid

tampering with

(LL)

,

though, it is clear, we must tamper a

bit with our concept of change.

A third alternative to accepting

is to con-

(Al)

sider persisting objects as consisting of temporal seg-

ments

3

In doing so, we would take expressions of the form

.

"b at

tj^"

and "b at t

"

2

as referring, not to the temporally

persisting b, but rather to two temporal segments of
existing at

t^^,

the other existing at t
2

.

view of persisting objects, then Premise
false.

b,

one

If we adopt this
(2)

of

(Al)

is

For, from the fact that an object persists through

a change in its parts,

something having p as

it does not follow that there is
a

part at one time and something lack-

ing p as a part at another time and that those things are

identical.

On the view we are considering, those things

would be distinct temporal segments of a persisting object.
An advantage of viewing persisting physical objects as

divisible into temporal segments is that it allows us both
to retain our conception of change as the gain and loss of

properties and to retain the pure form of

(LL)

.

However,

it has the disadvantage of being ontologically uneconomical

6

and theoretically unclear.

For we are left with the task

of explaining the relationship between
a persisting indivi-

dual and its temporal segments.

other alternatives is preferable.
be clear that

(Al)

Perhaps, then, one of our
In any case,

it should

does not force us to conclude that

nothing persists through changes in its parts.
to my car, we can say either of three things:
in my driveway now is identical to the car

I

Returning
(i)

the car

drove to Cali-

fornia last summ.er because the car in my driveway, though

lacking a muffler now, had one last summer, and the car

I

drove to California last summer, though having had a muffler
last summer, lacks one now;
is identical to the car

I

(ii)

the car in my driveway now

drove to California last summer

because, though the car in my driveway lacks the property
of having a muffler now, so too does the car

California last summer; or (iii) the car

I

I

drove to

drove to Cali-

fornia last summer is not identical to the car in my driveway now but rather each of them is a temporal segment of my
car, one that exists now and one that existed last sum.mer.

Leibniz' argument against the ordinary view

.

Another argu-

ment against persist^ence is suggested by Leibniz: "we cannot say, speaking according to the exact truth of things,

that the

saiTie

whole is preserved when

a

part is lost.

"

4

He goes on to say that since "whatever has corporeal parts

cannot fail to lose some of them at every moment.

.

.

.

,"

7

objects of this kind only appear to persist.^
IS what Hume would call a 'fiction'

Persistence

of the mind.

proposed by Leibniz seems to be this:

a

The view

whole consisting of,

say, three atoms a, b, c, is such that, if it
loses one of

those atoms, say, c, it is no longer the whole consisting
of a, b, c.

exists.

the whole consisting of a, b, c no longer

So,

Ordinary physical objects are wholes consisting of

numerous parts.

If a physical object loses one of those

parts, it is no longer the same whole.

longer exists.

So,

that object no

As Leibniz points out, and as science fur-

ther affirms, physical objects gain and lose parts (i.e.,
atoms) at every moment.
sist.
(A2)

So, physical objects do not per-

Again, the argument can be represented as a reductio:
(1)

Some physical objects persist through changes
in their parts.

(2)

(x)

is a physical object

(x

x is a whole

consisting of parts)
(3)

(x)

[

(x

(x is a whole consisting of parts

persists from

t

to t'

(f

>

t)

)

->

(3t)
(y)

(y

(at')

is

a part of x at t and y is a part of x at t')]}.
(4)

If

(1)

,

part at

(f
(5)

>

then (3x)(3y)(3t)(3t')(3p)
t"

(x

and x lacks p as a part at

has p as a
t'

t)).

No physical object persists through a change in
its parts.

8

A_

reply to Leibniz.

culprit.

in

(A2)

premise

appears to be the

(3)

Before pointing out why it is false, we should

consider why it might seem plausible.
Suppose we have a thing consisting of three parts
a,

b,

c.

b,

c"

refers to that thing.

The expression "the whole consisting of parts a,

sisting of parts
(PI)

a,

b,

With respect to the whole con-

the following is true:

c,

If b is a part of the whole consisting of parts a,
b,

c at t^,

a,

b, c exists at t

then,

if the whole consisting of parts
2

,

then b is a part of it at t
2

*

We would not want to deny that, any more than we would want
to deny that the whole consisting of parts
b,

c as parts.

a,

So, when Leibniz says that,

b,

c has a,

strictly speak-

ing, the same whole is not preserved when a part is lost,

the plausibility of his remark derives from the fact that,

indeed, if a whole consisting of parts a, b, c loses, say,

part b, then that whole no longer consists of parts
c.

a,

b,

If we think of the expression "same whole" as meaning

"whole consisting of the same parts," then Leibniz' asser-

tion amounts to the trivial, albeit true, claim that a

whole consisting of certain parts no longer consists of
those parts when a part is lost.
We need, however, another argument to prove that the

thing that consisted of parts a, b, c cannot be said, after

losing part b, now to consist of parts

a

and

c.

After all.

9

respect to the ordinary physical objects that
are the
subject of our investigation, we assume that they,
though

v;ith

being wholes consisting of parts, can consist of
some parts
at one time, and other parts at other times.

My car, when

it first c^ime into existence, had parts it no longer
has.

And now it has parts it did not have when it first came into existence.

So, until we are given reason to believe

otherwise, we can assume that Premise

Neither

(Al)

nor

(A2)

(3)

of

(A2)

is false.

is sufficient to persuade us

that physical objects don't persist through changes in their
parts.

We will now turn to the consideration of the problem

of the Ship of Theseus which is thought to supply reasons

for questioning our assumptions about persistence.
2.

The Problem of the Ship of Theseus

Plutarch's story and a variation by Hobbes

.

The problem of

the Ship of Theseus is, as Chisholm is fond of pointing out,
an ancient puzzle.

Plato mentions the

shd.p,

if not the

puzzle, when he has Phaedo explain the reason for the delay
in Socrates'

execution.

The day before his trial, a certain

ship, the one the Athenians sent to Delos, was crowned with

garlands, a sign that the city was to be kept pure.

It was

"the ship in which, the Athenians say, Theseus once sailed
to Crete.

..."

That this ship was the subject of philo-

sophical dispute is testified to by Plutarch in his Life of

10

"The ship wherein Theseus and the youth
of Athens

returned had thirty oars and was preserved down
to the time
of Demetrius Phalereus, for they took away the
old planks
as they decayed, putting in new and stronger
timber in their

place, insomuch that this ship became a standing
example

among philosophers, for the logical question of things that
grow; one side holding that the ship remained the same, and

the other contending that it was not the same."”^

Considering the story as it is presented by Plutarch, what features of it appear to raise problems?

pose

v/e

conclude that the ship that was crowned with garlands

in 399 B.C.

Crete.

Sup-

is identical to the ship Theseus once sailed to

After all, our reasoning might go, ships are con-

structed in such a way that repairs can be made if circumstances dictate and often, they do.

Our experience in-

cludes cases of ships damaging their hulls against barrier
reefs, losing their masts in storms, severing their keels
on rocky shoals.

We suppose that ships can survive calami-

ties of this sort.

And if they can, then certainly they

can withstand the normal wear and tear produced by the

exigencies of the tamer situations in which ships normally
find themselves.
for many years.

Properly cared for, a ship might survive
Given all this, it seems reasonable to

suppose that the ship that was crowned with garlands in
399 B.C.

is identical to the ship Theseus sailed to Crete,

11

though the former ship shares, let us assume,
no planks
with the latter ship.
The changes, after all, were gradual: when the first plank was replaced,
the resulting
ship

identical to the original, and when a plank of that ship
was replaced, the resulting ship was identical to the
pre-

vious ship.

And so on, we can suppose, down the line.

Since identity is transitive, it follows that, even when
the final original plank was replaced, the ship composed of

entirely new planks was identical to the original ship.
Thomas Hobbes proposed a variation on the original
story that might cause us to question our conviction that
this identity holds.

"Some man had kept the old planks as

they were taken out, and by putting them afterwards together
in the same order, had again made a ship of them.

.

.

.

This ship, composed entirely of the original planks, surely

seems to have some claim to being identical with the ship

Theseus sailed to Crete.
support to this view.

Here, too, our experience lends

We have heard of the enterprising

businessman who bought one of the London Bridges and had it
shipped to Arizona where it was reassembled.

There is the

Cloisters in New York which used to be in France.

And there

is the Sleigh Bed in my living room which has many times,

since its creation sometime in the 19th Century, been taken
apart for shipping, then reassembled in its new home.

Since

these objects persist through disassembling, so, too, can

12

the ship of the Hobbesian man.
R eid and Chisholm on the conventio nality of
identity claims.
It appears that the reasons for deciding in favor
of the

garlanded ship find an equal match in those on the side of
the ship of the Hobbesian man.

Some philosophers have taken

this as evidence that strict identity plays no role in the

persistence conditions for physical objects.

They suggest

that identity with respect to physical objects existing at

different times is a "matter of convention."

Its conven-

tional nature, they claim, is revealed by considering the

apparent disanalogy between personal and physical object
identity
Thomas Reid, for instance, says that identity
has no fixed nature when applied to bodies, and
questions about the identity of a body are very
often questions about words.
But identity, when
applied to persons, has no ambiguity and admits
not of degrees, or of more or less
.

.

.

Reid takes personal identity as a paradigm case of strict
persistence.

The question whether persons persist through

changes in their parts is moot, since persons, according to
Reid, have no parts.

Regular physical objects, however, do

have parts, and, according to Reid, our decision to pro-

nounce an object "the same" after an alteration of parts is

determined by factors of convenience and custom.

Thus, Reid

thinks that there are two concepts of identity--one that ap-

plies in cases of personal identity and one that applies in

13

cases of bodily identity.

The former concept he calls

perfect identity,' the latter 'imperfect identity.'
What considerations led Reid to the conclusion
that

perfect identity' has no application with respect
to the

persistence of physical objects?

Chisholm, whose sympathies

lie with Reid on this matter, offers some }iint.

Chisholm

asks us to consider some "problem" cases of personal iden-

tity

,

cases that are designed to illustrate the disanology

between personal and bodily identity.

One case in particu—

involves imagining oneself undergoing fission, where one

person "goes off" to the left and the other "goes off" to
the right.

He says.

It seems to me first that there is no possibility
whatever that you would be both the person on the
right and the person on the left.
It seems to me,
secondly, that there
a possibility that you
would be one or the other of those two persons.
I
think, moreover, that you could be one of those
persons and yet have no memory at all of your present existence.

Supposing you knew that the person going off to the left
were going to experience a miserable life, "no fears that
you might have, about being the half on the left, could

reasonably be allayed by the adoption of a convention,
though it be laid dovm by the highest authorities."^^
This case is parallel, in relevant respects, to that
of the ships.

Yet,

in the case of the ships, our ambiva-

lence between the two leaves open the possibility of

deciding, by means of some convention, that one or the

14

other is imperfectly identical to the original
ship.

As

we have seen in our discussion of Reid, the
supposed fact

that the decision is based on convention is evidence
enough
that we are not here dealing with perfect identity.

Reid and,

I

Thus,

think, Chisholm, are presupposing that if a

question of identity can be decided by convention, then the
kind of identity involved is imperfect identity.

We can

introduce here Chisholm's terms for these two kinds of
identity, namely

strictly identical to y' and

'x is

loosely identical to y

.
'

'x

is

We are already familiar with the

relation of strict identity.

V7ith

respect to loose iden-

tity,

the following seems to hold:

(P2)

X is loosely identical to y iff a decision that x

and y are identical is based on convention.

This suggests the following anti-persistence argument:
(A3)

(1)

If physical objects existing at different times

can only be loosely identical, then physical

objects don't persist through changes in their
parts
(2)

Physical

objects existing at different times

can only be loosely identical.
(3)

Physical objects don't persist through changes
in their parts.

A replv to Reid and Chisholm.
^

Chisholm's fission case is

supposed to demonstrate that since the person fission case
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can't be decided by convention, we should
conclude that
identity, with respect to persons, is strict
identity.

Let

us compare the person fission case with the ship
case in

order to see where the purported difference lies.

in both

cases we would want to deny, to avoid violation of transi-

tivity

,

that both 'later' things are identical to the

'earlier' one.

Presumably, the fact that each ship appears

to be an equally good candidate suggests that neither is

strictly identical to the earlier one.

But why doesn't this

fact yield the same result in the case of the persons?

As

Chisholm himself admits, if we suppose that neither person
has any memory of his present experience,

"there might well

be no criterion by means of which you or anyone else could

decide which of the two halves was in fact yourself.
The reason, then, appears to be this: in the case of
the ships, we could imagine an advocate for the Hobbesian

ship and an advocate for the garlanded ship unable to come
to any agreement, appealing to a 'high authority.'

fact

The

that the decision might go either way is seen as a

reason for supposing that strict identity is no longer at
issue.
sons.

But the case is no different when we consider per-

Suppose the right hand person insists that he is

identical to you, and the left hand person insists that
is identical to you.

^

Couldn't a high authority, after care-

fully considering the facts of the case, decide on pruden-
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tial grounds

(support for children, mortgage payments) that

the right hand person is identical to
you?

He would make

his decision on prudential grounds since he
has no better

criterion on which to base it.

All the authority can do is

decide that one side or the other is loosely identical
to
you.

There remains the possibility that, in fact, the left

hand person is strictly identical to you.

But doesn't there

remain, in the ship case, though an authority decides the

Hobbesian ship is loosely identical to the original ship,
the possibility that the garlanded ship is strictly identical to the original ship?

If the ship case is really dif-

ferent from the person case, then

must be denied.

I

I

think this possibility

am not at all sure that it should be.

The point is this: unless we assume that it is not

possible that either later ship is strictly identical to the
earlier ship, then the fact that a conventional decision

might go either way does not yield the result that

v;e

dealing only with some sort of spurious identity.

Since we

are

have not yet been convinced that this is not possible,

carries no v/eight.

(A3)

(A3)

gains what force it has from

reasoning such as this: if it is difficult to decide which
of two things is identical to another, then neither is

identical to the other.

Once we point out, however, that

problem cases of personal identity can pose the same questions as problem cases of physical object identity, the
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weakness of this reasoning becomes apparent.

^e
_

four po ssi bilities

.

It should be clear that the Prob-

lem of the Ship of Theseus presents us with
four possibilities: either
399 B.C.

(i)

the ship that was crowned with garlands in

is identical to the original ship; or

the

(ii)

ship of the Hobbesian man is identical to the original
ship;
or

(iii)

both the garlanded ship and the Hobbesian ship are

identical to the original ship; or (iv) neither ship is

identical to the original ship.

in considering the Chis-

holm/Reid claim that there is a disanalogy between personal
and physical object identity, we concluded that it was not

sufficient to persuade us that we should abandon strict
identity.

The fact that we lack a clear criterion for de-

ciding between the two ships does not entail, by itself,
that neither is strictly identical to the original.

A

proponent of the fourth possibility would do better to show
that none of the other possibilities is tenable.

Of

course, if the fourth possibility is the only acceptable
one, then

v;e

must deny that physical objects strictly per-

sist through changes in their parts.
An argument for the fourth possibility

.

Our discussion of

the four possibilities suggests the following argument:
(A4)

(1)

Either possibility
or (iii)

(i)

is true, or

is true, or

(iv)

is true.

(ii)

is true,
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(2)

Possibilities (i),

(3)

(iv)

(4)

If

(ii),

(iii)

are false.

is true.

(iv)

is true,

then the original ship did not

persist through changes in its parts.
(5)

If the ship did not persist,

then in general

physical objects don't persist through such
changes.
(6)

Physical objects don't persist through such
changes

Let us see, then, whether Premise
true.

(2)

of

(A4)

is

To do so, we will first consider, v/ith respect to

each of the first three possibilities, whether there are
any positive reasons for thinking it is true.

If we find

there are none, we can then determine whether the lack of

any positive reasons constitutes sufficient grounds for con-

ceding to the advocates of

(A4)

The first possibility: the principle of gradu al change

Suppose we stick with our initial reasoning, that which led
to the conclusion that the garlanded ship is identical to

the original ship.

That reasoning was based on the assump-

tion that a thing can change its parts provided that the
change is gradual.
this

The relevant persistence principle is
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(P3)

X at t = y at t’

(f

a

part and y at

a

gradual change).

t'

>

t)

if

(p)

has p as a part

(X at t

lacks p as

acquired p by

There are, however, examples of what might be considered gradual change that violate our intuitions about
identity.

Carrying the ship case a bit further, and sup-

posing that, during the course of two thousand years or so,
the planks of the garlanded ship were gradually replaced

with others of a different size and different material, we

might find ourselves forced to admit that the Boeing 747

Jetliner that just took off from Kennedy Airport is identical to the ship Theseus sailed to Crete.

Given this sort

case, it might appear that an essential feature of gradual

change is the resemblance the replacement parts bear to the

replaced parts.

That is, if a change is to count as a

gradual change, the part that is removed must be replaced
by one that resembles it. 15

Even allowing a generous interpretation of the re-

semblance relation required to elucidate the notion of a

gradual change,

(P3)

will not do.

For suppose that Jason

and his Argonauts possessed a ship closely resembling the

ship Theseus sailed to Crete, and that Jason replaced all
but one oarlock of his ship with Theseus' ship minus the

relevant oarlock of that ship.
ly Theseus'

The replacement part, name-

ship minus one oarlock, resembles the replaced
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part, namely Jason's ship minus one oarlock.

it would be

odd to say the ship Jason now has is identical
to the ship
he had before the change.
But if we add one further feature
to our story, we get an even more unwelcome
result.

Suppose

that after using Theseus' ship minus one oarlock as
the re-

placement part for Jason's ship, we replace the oarlock of
Jason

s

original ship with the oarlock of Theseus' ship.

Having done that, we are left, if

(P3)

is true, with two

ships identical to the ship Jason had before the change,

since each is produced by adding
of the original.

a

similar part to a part

As we will see in our discussion of the

third possibility, this result runs counter to our most

basic assumptions about identity.
The second possibility: the principle of shared decomposi-

tion

.

Let us, then, consider the second possibility, name-

ly that the ship of the Hobbesian man is identical to the

original ship.

There, our reasoning was based on the as-

sumption that if one thing shares its parts with another,
then they are, in fact, one and the same' thing.
(P4)

X at t = y at t

'

if

(p)

(p is a

That is:

part of x at

t = p

is a part of y^ at t').

This assumption, however, needs refinement.

While the

planks of the Hobbesian ship are those of the original ship,
not all of its parts are.
al ship did not have.

Surely, it has atoms the origin-

In*order to express our assumption
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more accurately, we must appeal to the
concept of a decomposition.
What we take to be the parts of an object
depends upon how we "take the object apart."
We can consider
tne parts of a ship to be atoms, or molecules,
or planks,

or a hull, a foredeck and a galley.

For any "kind" of

part, such that an object can be said to consist
completely

of that kind of part, there is a decomposition
of the object into that kind of part.

Taking x is a part of y as

primitive, and defining overlapp ing as:
(Dl)

X overlaps y = df

.

(3p)

(p

is a part of x and p

is a part of y)
a

decomposition of an object M can be defined as:

(D2)

D is a decomposition of M = df.

is a part of M)
s

;

(ii)

(p) (s)

p does not overlap s)

p

7^

a

part of M

(3s)

(s

e.

(i) (p)

(p e
;

(p 6

D and S

and (iii)

D

p

->

e

D and

(p)

(p

D and s overlaps p)

is

)

Thus, no member of a decomposition of an object overlaps

another and every part of that object is

decomposition set of it.

a

member of some

Appealing to this concept, we can

now say that a thing existing at one time is identical to
thing existing at another provided they share

a

decomposi-

tion.
(P5)

^

X at t = y at t'

if

(3D)

(D is

a

decomposition of

X at t and D is a decomposition of y at t')

•

The ship of the Hobbesian man and the ship Theseus sailed

a
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to Crete are identical since the set
that is the decomposi-

tion into planks of one is the same as the set
that is the

decomposition into planks of the other.
Unfortunately,

(P5),

too, faces difficulties.

we suppose that sharing a decomposition is

a

If

necessary con-

dition for the identity of a thing existing at one time
and
a thing existing at another,

then ultimately, the result is

what we might call an extreme form of atomism.

We supposed

that the ship Theseus sailed to Crete and the ship of the

Hobbesian man were identical since they shared a decom.position into planks.

But if we are to be sure that the planks

of the original ship are identical to the planks of the

Hobbesian ship, then they, too, must share a decomposition.
/

So,

too,

for the parts of the planks and for their parts.

Finally, we might arrive at some smallest indivisible particles.

Let us call these "atoms."

(P5)

then, amounts to

the claim that a thing existing at one time is identical to
a

thing existing at another provided they share

sition into atoms.

gestion than that

a

decompo-

This seems a far more conservative sugv/ith

which we started.

It might be suggested, at this point, that

better seen as simply a sufficient, not

a

(P5)

necessary, con-

dition for the identity of things existing at different
times.

is

But if we attempt to avoid atomism by insisting

that a different principle operates with respect to the
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planks than does with respect to the ship, we
are obligated
to explain first what the principle might
be and second

what reason we have for thinking that the principle
applies
in one case and not in the other.

if we take

(P3)

as a

sufficient, though not necessary, condition for the identity of things existing at different times, then, since
the

planks themselves were not disassembled, it might be said
that (P3) applies to them.

(P5)

would then be left for

cases of disassembled things.

But our lack of success in formulating a correct

version of

(P3)

is paralleled in the case of

(P5)

.

It is

not clear that (P5) works in the case of disassembled objects.

Suppose that the ship Theseus sailed to Crete was

disassembled and a number of centuries later the planks
were used in the construction of Sancho Panza's windmill.
Though the ship and the windmill share a decomposition,
namely, the set containing the planks as members, we may

well be disinclined to think them identical.
The third possibility

.

Ignoring for the moment the inade-

quacy of (P3) and (P5) as sufficient conditions for identity across time, there is a more general problem inherent in

our suggestion that they should serve only as sufficient

conditions.

This problem is brought out by consideration of

the third possibility with respect to the identity of the
ships, namely that both the Hobbesian ship and the ship that
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was crowned with garlands are identical
to the original
snip.

If,, in our

attempts to deal with the first two

possibilities, we had successfully formulated
two principles, each sufficient, though not
necessary, conditions
for identity across time, we v;ould be
forced to the conclusion that both ships are identical to the
original
ship.

And yet we have no principle to insure that
the two ships
are themselves identical.

Well we should not; surely, if

we assume that the ship of the Hobbesian man and
the ship
that was crowned with garlands could exist at the same
time,
then the supposition that they are identical would violate
our most basic convictions about identity.

The ship of the

Kobbesian man has properties that the garlanded ship does
not.

The denial that they are identical stands us in no

better stead.

We are assuming that identity is an equiva-

lence relation and so, is transitive.

Yet, if the two

ships are not themselves identical but are each identical
to the original ship, then we must deny that identity is

transitive.

In discussing the Reid/Chisholm argument, we

already rejected this possibility.

Another approach to the fourth possi bility.

considered the first three possibilities.
clearly false.

We have now
The third is

With respect to the first two, we have not

found them to be false, but rather have found that the

general metaphysical principle underlying each defies
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straightforward formulation.

Are we ready yet to accept

the fourth possibility and so concede to
the proponent of
(A4)?
The proponent of (A4) argues that we should
accept

the fourth possibility given the falsity of
the other three.
On this line of reasoning, the fourth possibility
is not

conceived as having positive reasons in its favor but
is
instead seen as the only choice left to us.

Since, at this

point, the first two remain open, we should not feel
forced
to accept the fourth.
(A4)

has as a premise that the fourth possibility

entails the non— persistence of physical objects through

changes in their parts.

But the following entailment also

holds
(P6)

If physical objects do not persist through changes

in their parts, then possibility

Given the truth of

(P5)

(iv)

is true.

some philosophers have

thought it better to approach the problem from a perspective opposite to that of the proponent of

(A4).

Chisholm

and Locke, for instance, ask us to make the troubling as-

sumption that physical objects do not persist through
changes in their parts. 17

Only by doing so, they argue,

can we arrive at a solution to problems such as that of the

Ship of Theseus.

The viability of that assumption, and so

of the fourth possibility, is then to be determined by the

success of their proposed solutions.
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Given the recalcitrance of the first two
possibilities, we might benefit from considering
this approach.

In

Chapters II and III, where the theories of Locke
and Chisholm, respectively, will be examined in detail,
we will do
just that.

Neither theory, it will be argued, lives up to

its claims and so neither provides a reason to
accept the

troubling assumption upon which both are based.
Both theories, however, do provide further insight
into the ordinary view of persistence to which

Chapter IV.

return in

There, the ordinary view, and with it the

first two possib.ilities
scrutiny.

v/e

,

will be subjected to greater

The ordinary view rests,

undeniably shaky foundation.

I

will argue, on an

If my reasons for thinking so

are right, the ordinary view cannot yield a solution to the

Problem of the Ship of Theseus.

The troubling assumption

made by Locke and by Chisholm appears a relatively tame

alternative once this foundation is revealed.
ly,

Unfortunate-

their theories borrow enough from the ordinary view

that they, too, fall prey to its difficulties.

We are

left, then, without a solution, but not without a clear

idea why philosophers have had such trouble finding one.
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.
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LOCKE ON PERSISTENCE
1.

Locke's Principles of Identity
a nd Diversity

Our ideas of identity and diversity

John Locke is one

.

Philosopher whose views about identity are worth consider”
ing in light of the difficulties raised by the problem of
the Ship of Theseus.

It is often thought that Locke was an

early proponent of the theory that identity is relative.
In what follows, an alternative interpretation of Locke

will be developed, one that appears,

I

think, to be more

consistent with various of his ontological presuppositions.
V7e

a

can then determine whether such an interpretation yields

solution to the problem of the Ship of Theseus.
The first paragraph of Locke's chapter on Identity

and Diversity consists in an initially puzzling juxtaposi-

tion of identity and diversity as concepts that arise from

considering an object at a single time and identity and
diversity as concepts that arise from comparing an object
existing at one time, with an object existing at a different
time.

To give an adequate account of Locke's views, it

will be necessary to determ.ine what role these concepts are

intended to play.
30
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Locke begins by saying, "Another occasion
the mind

often takes of comparing, is the very being of
things,
when, considering anything as existing at
any determined
time and place, we compare it with itself existing
at

another time, and thereon form the ideas of identity
and
diversity."

Given just this much, it seems clear that

Locke takes identity through time as the paradigm case of
identity.

That he should think so is a result of his be-

lief that identity and diversity are relations, and as
such, hold between

(at least)

two things.

We get our ideas of relations from the comparison
of two (or more) objects.

There is a difficulty with the

relation of identity, however, because it is

a

relation

holding between a thing and itself, not between two things
Hume, whose approach to the problem was much the same as

Locke's put the matter this way:
the view of any one object is not sufficient to
convey the idea of identity.
For in that proposition an object is the same with itself if the
idea expressed by the word ob j ect were no ways
distinguished from that meant by itself we really
should m.ean nothing.
One object conveys the
idea of unity, not that of identity.^
,

,

;

.

.

.

Thus, it appears that both Locke and Hume had a vague pre-

monition of the Fregean insight that in significant identity statements the expressions flanking the identity sign

have different senses.

They overlooked the existence of

identity statements such as "the library is the tallest
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building on campus" and so assumed that the only
significant statements of identity are those asserting
the identity of a thing existing at one time with a thing
existing at
a distinct time.

Viewing the m.atter in this way, Hume and

Locke could also account for the relational nature of

identity since objects standing in the relation of identity
at different times, this provides the difference re-

quisite to comparison.
Sameness of spatio-temporal location: an unsuccessful

formulation

.

While Hume seems to have thought that the

"view of any one object" plays no role in our acquisition
of the concept of identity, Locke thought that it did.
he next says,

For

"when we see anything to be in any place at

any instant of time, we are sure (be it what it will) that
it is that very thing, and not another which at the same

time exists in another place, how like and indistinguish-

able soever it may be in all other respects."

The rela-

tion of identity is like that of 'being as big as.'

Though

it is true that everything is as big as itself, and that

that fact is implicit in judgments we make by means of that

relation, the idea would never arise in us simply from comparing, as it were, a thing with itself.

Locke appears to

have thought that our ideas of relations such as these

arise only because there is some question as to whether two
things stand in them.

As he puts it,

"when we therefore
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demand whether anything be the same or no, it
refers always to something that existed such and such,

a time in such

a place,

which it was certain, at that instant, was the

same as itself, and no other.

When we consider an object at

a

single time, there

is no room for any question as to its identity to
arise.

According to Locke, each thing occupies a unique 'place'
at
a single time.

The fact that other things, even though

they may resemble the considered object, occupy distinct

places is sufficient to insure that they are other than the

considered object.

Furthermore, we can be certain that

each object occupies a unique place because "we never finding, nor conceiving it possible that two things of the same

kind should exist in the same place at the same time, we

rightly conclude, that, whatever exists anywhere at any
time, excludes all of the seune kind, and is there itself

alone."

5

Shortly, we will examine in more detail Locke's

suggestion concerning the role of spatial location in determining identity, but for the time being a rough charac-

terization of its role will suffice: each thing occupies
(at a

particular time) a particular place from which all

other things of its kind are excluded.

This restriction

with respect to kind is necessary since it is possible for
a

material thing and a spiritual thing both to occupy

single place at a single time.

a

The fact that each thing of
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kind has its unique place at a single
time plays an important part in determinations of the identity
of things
existing at different times.
Suppose you want to know
whether an object at t^, 0
^, is identical to an object at
a

t^,

Since it is possible for one thing to occupy
dif-

ferent places at different times, the spatial
location of
O2 or
would be of no use. What you need is to determine

whether there is some place such that both
in that place at somie time.

and O. were

Since no two things of the

same kind can be in the same place at the same time, it

would follow that O2 and
that 0

^

are identical.

If you know

came into existence at a particular place at

a

par-

ticular time, and you know that O2 came into existence at
that same time in the same place, then you can conclude
that O2 and

are identical.

The time and place of a

thing's beginning to exist affords a means by which we can

answer the question "Is the thing picked out by this temporal description the same as the thing picked out by that

temporal description?"

Locke's own words are as follows:

One thing cannot have tv;o beginnings of existence,
it being impossible for two things of the same
kind to be or exist in the same instant, in the
very same place; or one and the same thing in different places. “That, therefore that had one beginning, is the same thing; and that which had a different beginning in time and place from that, is
not the same, but diverse.^
We can now turn to the task of attempting to formu-

late Locke's words in such a way that they produce the
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results he intended them to have.

We have seen that Locke

makes the following statement concerning
the relation between a thing and its spatial location:
"we never finding,
nor conceiving it possible that two things
of the same kind
should exist in the same place at the same

..."

time.

This suggests the following interpretation:
(PI)

i-

O

and

2

is in p at t)

(3t) (3p)

is in p at t and O
2

.

The concept of complete occupation

.

Though

ly literal translation of Locke's words,

his purpose.

is a fair-

(PI)

it does not serve

Places are regions of space that, unless

otherwise restricted, may be of any size.

Thus, my desk is

in my study and my bookcase is in my study and so

I

titled to say that they are both in the same place.
Locke intended something more restrictive.

am en-

Surely

The place of a

thing is presumably some region of space that is completely

filled up by that thing.

Locke's idea can be captured by

the following definition:
(Dl)

O completely occupies p at t iff

part of p at
O'

is in p'

(3p')

Using (Dl)
(P2)

(p'

(Pi)

'^^(Oj^

t *> (30')

at

t)

;

(ii)

(O'

(i)

(p')

is part of 0

(O')

(O'

(p'

is

at t and

is part of 0 at t

is part of p at t and O'

is in p'

at t)

.

becomes

i O 2 and

(3t)

Op)

(Oj^

completely occupies p

at t and O 2 completely occupies p at

t)

.
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ihis more restrictive characterization
of an object's

place is perhaps what Locke had in mind when he
later said
that It IS impossible "for two things of the
same kind to
be or exist in the very instant, in the very
same place.

From

we can derive a sufficient condition for

(P2)

identity:
(P3)

(3t) (-3P)

completely occupies p at

(O^

t and O

2

completely occupies p at t)-^
^1 “ ^2*
and the converse of (P3) provides a statement of the necessary condition of diversity:
(P4)

completely occupies p at

^
t and 0^

completely occupies p at

t)

.

Locke also makes it clear that it is impossible for
"one and the same thing" to exist "in different places at

the same instant"

(p.

This assertion can be rendered

440).

as
(P5)

= O

-^<>{0^^

2

and

(3p) (3p') (3t)

(p

p'

and

0^^

com-

pletely occupies p at t and O completely occupies
2
p
VJhile
(P6)

'

at t

(P5)

)

}

is a fairly literal rendering of Locke's words,

resembles

(PI)

-

(P4)

more closely, and follows from

LL:
= O

(P6)

2

and

(

p)

(

t)

(0^^

completely occupies p

at t and O 2 does not completely occupy p at

From (P6),

v/e

t)

}

can derive a necessary condition for identity:
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(P7)

^2"*^

t ana 0

(3p) (3t)

completely occupies p at

does not completely occupy
p at
and a sufficient condition foir diversity:
(P8)

Op)

t)

^

(3t)

(0^

completely occupies p at

does not completely occupy
p at

t

.

and ©2

t) ->

0 ^,

Since, according to Locke, every substance
occupies space,
the following is true:
(P9)

(O) (3t) (3p)

(P9)

together with

(o

completely occupies p at

(P7)

t)

yields a new necessary condition

for identity:
(PIO)

~

(3t) (3p)

t and 0

Taking

(P3)

(0^

completely occupies p at

completely occupies p at

^

and

(PIC)

t)

together, we get a statement of

necessary and sufficient conditions for identity:
= 0

(Pll)
t

^

iff

completely occupies p at

(3p) (3t)

and ©2 completely occupies p at

t)

The same reasoning applies with respect to diversity.

Given (P9)

we can infer from (P4)

a

new statement of a

necessary condition for diversity:
(P12)

(3t)

^

(Oj^

completely occupies p at

and ©2 does not completely occupy p at

t

t)

which, together with (P8), yields a statement of necessary
and sufficient conditions for diversity:
(P13)

Oj^

t

O

2

iff

(9p) (3t)

(0^

completely occupies p at

and O does not completely occupy p at
2

t)

.
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Brody on Locke's principles of identity and diversity

.

If

our earlier conjectures as to Locke's intent concerning
the role of a thing's spatial location in determinations

of identity and diversity are right, then we should view
(Pll)

and

(P13)

as stating respectively the necessary and

sufficient conditions of identity and diversity that are
used in making determinations of the identity and diversity of things existing at the

Scime

time.

But are we

thereby committed to thinking that Locke rejects the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals?

Baruch Brody

ascribes to Locke the view that "(2') x and y are identical if they are in the same place at the same time" and

suggests that he ought to have held "(2") x and y are

identical if they are in the same place at the same time
and have all of their properties in common."

Brody, ap-

parently ignoring Locke's restriction that what Brody calls
(2')

applies only to things of the same kind, rejects it on

the grounds that "after all, my body and

I

are in the same

place at the same time, but they cannot be identical since
there are some properties they do not have in common.
Since (2") does not face this problem, in that it "poses

a

more restrictive condition for identity than (2')," Brody
takes it to be the plausible alternative but ends by saying,

"unfortunately, it is not the one that Locke adopted."
In reply to Brody,

it should first be noted that
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his

(

2 ")

is redundant.

If we specify that it is sufficient

for the identity of x and y that they have all their prop-

erties in common, then there is no need to specify further
that they must also be in the same place at the same time.

Furthermore, and

importantly, Brody fails to recognize

m.ore

the purpose of Locke's statements of identity.

Locke does not

v;ant to

Presumably,

deny the principle of the indis-

cernibility of identicals; what he is after is

a

criterion

by means of which we can judge whether things satisfy that

principle.

An advantage of our interpretation is precisely

that it takes Locke to be singling out

a

property, namely

sameness of place, that can serve as such a criterion.
The beginnings of existence

.

We now turn to a further elu-

cidation of Locke's views as to the role of a thing's beginning of existence in determinations of identity.

It was

suggested earlier that Locke took the problem of determining the identity of things considered at different times to
be a slightly different problem from that of determining

the identity of things considered at a single time.
seemiCd to think that if we are considering,

He

say, an object

O2 at t2 and wondering whether it is identical to an object
at t^, then,

if we find that they have the same begin-

ning, then we can conclude that they are in fact one and
the same thing.

If,

on the other hand, they have different

beginnings, then we can conclude that they are diverse.
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Once again, it is best to see Locke as
attempting to provide a criterion for use in making determinations
of identity or diversity.
What, then, is a thing's beginning?

Presumably,

Locke means to suggest that it is the time and place
at

which a thing first exists.

Using our concept of complete

occupation, we can devise the following principle:
(P14)

0 begins to exist in p at t iff 0 completely

occupies p at

and ~(3t')(3p')

t

completely occupies

p'

(t'

<

t and O

at t').

Thus, v/hen Locke says "one thing cannot have two beginnings
of existence," we should take him to mean:
(P15)

'^OCBt)

(

3t

)

(3p) (3p')

(t

t'

begins to exist in p at

exist in p
(P15)

'

at t

'

and p

and 0

t

p

and

begins to
^^

)

yields, in turn, the following sufficient condition

of diversity:
(P16)

(-3t)

(3t') (3p) (3p')

(t

t'

and p

7^

p

and

0^^

begins to exist in p at t and O begins to
2
exist in p' at t')

^ 02

*

The difficulty with (P15) and (P16) is that given what

Locke says, it seems they are to follow from

"...

respectively.
of existence

...

the same thing

(P 6

)

and

(P 8

)

one thing cannot have two beginnings

it being impossible for

[to be or exist]

.

.

.

one and

in different places."

12

It
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is clear that they do not so follow.

We would do better,

then, to interpret Locke as saying merely:
(P17)

= O

2

and (3t) (3p)

begins to exist in

p at t and O 2 does not begin to exist in p at t)

which yields its companion sufficient condition
for diversity

:

(P18)

begins to exist in p at t and O
2

(t) (p)

does not begin to exist in p at
To demonstrate that (P18)

show that if (P8)

t)

0 ^.

is derivable from

is true,

(P8)

then (P18) is true.

must show that if 0^ begins to exist in p at
not begin to exist in p at t, then

t

,

That is, we
and O does
2

completely occupies

0^^

p at t and O 2 does not completely occupy p at t.
(P14)

,

if

Given

begins to exist in p at t, then 0^ completely

occupies p at t and there is no time
that

we must

occupies a place

p'

t'

prior to t such

(identical or not to

p)

at t

'

.

Supposing that the first disjunct is true, then
0^ completely occupies p at t, but O does not.
2

If the second

disjunct is true, then there is a place p'

(identical or

not to p) that is completely occupied by O at
2
by 0^.

So, we can conclude that

(P18)

t'

but not

is derivable from

(P8).

Turning to Locke's other assertion, namely that two
things cannot have one beginning of existence, we get:
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(P19)

O

p at t and 0

From
tity

and

2

(3p) (3t)

(0^^

begins to exist in

begins to exist in p at

^

t)

.

we can derive a sufficient condition for iden-

(P2.9)

:

(P20)

begins to exist in p at t and O
2

(3p) (3t)

begins to exist in p at
These should follow from

(P2)

0^ = O 2

t)

and (P3)

.

respectively, since

Locke says that two things cannot have one beginning of

existence, "it being impossible for two things of the same

kind to be or exist in the same instant, in the very same
place."

13

Fortunately, given (P14)

,

they are easily de-

rivable.
The application of the principles of

sity

.

i dentity

and diver-

In our treatment of Locke's concept of complete

occupation, we were able to derive criteria for making de-

terminations of the identity and diversity of things existing at the same time.

These criteria consisted in neces-

sary and sufficient conditions for identity and diversity.
The question now arises whether we can transform, in a

parallel fashion,

(P18)

and (P20)

into biconditionals.

If

we can, then the following must be true;
(P21)

and O
(P22)

(0p) (3t)

^

0i

begins to exist in p at

does not begin to exist in p at

2

= O

(Oj^

2

->

Op)

(3t)

t

t)

(0^ begins to exist in p at t

and ©2 begins to exist in p at

t)
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The problem with (P21) and (P22)
not appear to hold for eternal objects.

is that

do

the;-,

If we suppose

(though Locke would prefer another example) that numbers

are eternal objects, and if

(P21)

required to say that the number

9

is true,

and the number

diverse only if one begins to exist in
that the other doesn't.

neither

9

nor

5

then we would be

a

5

are

place at a time

But if numbers are eternal, then

begins to exist anywhere at any time.

Similarly, if the number

9

and the number that is the

square root of 81 are identical, and (P22) is true, then
they both must begin to exist at the same time in the same
place.

But if numbers are eternal, then neither begins to

exist anywhere at any time.
true, then

9

and

5

So,

if

(P21)

fail to be diverse, and

and (P22) are
9

and the square

root of 91 fail to be identical.

Locke does not address himself to the general problem of eternal objects.

Rather, he says "We have the ideas

but of three sorts of substances:

telligences.

3.

Bodies."

14

1.

God.

2.

Finite

in--

So, God is the only object

Locke takes to be eternal, or at least is the only eternal

object Locke wishes to consider.

Of God, Locke says,

"First, God is without beginning, eternal, unalterable, and

everywhere, and therefore concerning his identity there can
be no doubt.

It would help Locke's cause if we could

take him to be saying that the principles concerning
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identity and diversity that he has just
presented are intended to apply only to those things concerning
whose identity there can be doubt, namely, things that do
have be-

ginnings, or contingent things.

If this interpretation is

acceptable, then we can adopt (P21) and (P22) and, accordingly, the following biconditionals:
(P23)

0^ ^ ©2 iff
t and

(P24)

Op)

(3t)

{

0

^

begins to exist in p at

does not begin to exist in p at

= O

iff

2

t and O

2

(3p) (3t)

t)

begins to exist in p at

begins to exist in p at

t)

If we are correct in our interpretation, then Locke intends
(P23)

and (P24) as criteria for determining when things

existing at different times are the same or diverse.
we should substitute for
'O at t^'

and

'0 at tg

,
'

*

^2

*

Thus,

^^P^^ssions such as

where the objects referred to by

these expressions are things of the same Lockean ontological category

(i.e., bodies or finite intelligences).

For,

after the above statement about God, Locke goes on to say:
Secondly, Finite spirits, having had each its determinate time and place of beginning to exist,
the relation to that time and place will always
determine to each of them its identity, as long
as it exists.
Thirdly, the same will hold of
every particle o^f matter, to which no addition or
subtraction of matter being made, it is the same.-^°
Some philosophers have taken this last statement as
an indication that Locke intended his principles concerning

spatial relation and the beginning of existence to apply
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only to simple substances; that when
Locke said we have
ideas but, of three sorts of substances:
1.

Finite intelligences.

3.

God.

2.

Bodies," he meant by 'bodies,'

individual particles of matter or what Locke
called
'atoms.'

The evidence for this view is found in Locke's

phrase 'every particle of matter' and in his later
state-

ments concerning the

'

principium individuationis

.
'

After

stating what he takes it to be, he says "Though this seems

easier to conceive in simple substances or modes; yet, when

reflected on, is not more difficult in compound ones."^^
This is taken to be a transitional statement.

That is,

having told us about "the principium individuationis " for
simple substances, he will now do the same for compound
ones.

If this view is correct,

then the principles we have

formulated would not apply, as we have suggested, to contingent things in general, but rather only to those that
are simple.

This interpretation is not without its difficulties.
First, it is not in general true that when Locke uses the

expression 'Bodies,' he means it to refer only to atoms.
Second, we have seen that after Locke names the three sorts
of substances of which we have ideas, he then explains

hov;

his principles concerning the beginning of existence apply
to each of them.

Unless we suppose that Locke does not

count our ideas of compound bodies as ideas of substances.
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then It seems strange that he would claim,
without mentioning why, that his principles apply only
to one sort of
body.

But Locke does often talk about our ideas
of com-

pound bodies as ideas of substances.

Furthermore, immedi-

ately after his statement about 'every particle of
matter,'
he goes on to argue that the denial of his principles
con-

cerning spatial location and the beginnings of existence
results in absurdity

.

He illustrates the absurdity by say-

ing,

For example could two bodies be in the same place
at the same time; then those parcels of matter must
be one and the same, take them great or little;
nay, all bodies must be one and the same.
For by
the same reason that tv;o particles of matter may be
in one place, all bodies may be in one place: which
when it can be supposed, takes away the distinction
of identity and diversity of one and more and
renders it ridiculous.!^
:

Thus, it is reasonable to suppose that when Locke

used the expression "every particle of matter," he meant it
to refer not only to atoms but also to the things that they

compose
The limitations of Locke's principles

.

'Section

4

of Locke's

chapter marks a puzzling change in the focus of his discussion.

Though he sugjgests that he is merely pointing out

how his principles concerning spatial location and beginnings of existence apply in particular cases, in the course
of doing so he alludes to additional factors requisite to

making judgments of identity through time.

It should be
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clear that Locke's principles concerning
spatial location
are hardly sufficient.
For example, suppose I am curious
whether the ship Theseus sailed to Crete is in
fact the
ship that was crowned with garlands in 399
B.C.
to Locke,

I

According

need merely determine whether they began to

exist at the same time in the same place, or whether there
is some time at which they both completely occupied
the

same place.

Clearly, this suggestion merely raises the

question in a slightly different way.

That is, my curios-

ity about the identity of these ships might well manifest

itself in this way

:

did the ship that was crowned with gar-

lands in 399 B.C. come into existence at the same time, in
the same place, that the ship that Theseus sailed to Crete

did or did it come into existence at some point during the
change of planks?

Part of my curiosity about the identity

of the ships stems from the fact that

origin of the garlanded ship.

I

am unsure about the

Locke's principles do not

allay my curiosity, they serve only to refocus it.

Whether or not Locke fully realized the limitations
of his principles, in Section

4,

he does suggest additional

ones that come closer to answering the central question

concerning identity *through time: do things persist through
changes in their parts?

Just how he intends to answer the

question, however, is not entirely clear.

Many interpre-

ters have attributed to Locke the view that identity is
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relative.

Certainly, there is evidence in Section

in the sections that follow it,

tion.

4,

and

to support this interpreta-

On the other hand, if one places Locke's
views about

identity in the context of his larger philosophical
views,
it is no longer clear that we should attribute
such a view

to him.

It v;ill be worthwhile to examine what he says

rather closely

,

and in so doing attempt to discover whether

any coherent theory of persistence

(and so identity)

can be

found.

2.

The Problem of Diffe ring
Persistence Criteria

Some metaphysical underpinnings

If,

.

in Section 4, we take

Locke as attempting to answer the question whether things

persist through changes in their parts, it is reasonably
clear that his answer is, "It depends."

With respect to

atoms, he says, the question is moot, since atoms have no
parts.

With respect to what Locke calls "masses of matter,"

the answer is "no."

He says.

In like manner, if two or more atoms be joined together into the same mass
whilst they exist
united together, the mass, consisting of the same
atoms, must be the sanie mass, or the same body,
let the parts be_^ ever so differently jumbled.
But if one of these atoms be taken av/ay, or a new
one added, it is no longer the same mass or the
same body.^^
.

.

.

Already, we are presented with difficulties.
Locke discusses, at various points in the Essay

,

When

our ideas
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of substance, he brings into play the
notion of masses of

matter. 22

Roughly, his view seems to be this: the real and

basic existents are atoms, or particles of matter
and collections of these atoms or particles.

These parcels of

matter have two different 'kinds' of essence: real and
nominal.

The nominal essence 'depends' on the real essence

in the following way: parcels of matter are ranked into

sorts.

In order that a particular parcel of matter be,

for

instance, gold, it must have certain observable properties.

These properties; yellowness, fusibility, malleability,
etc.

,

constitute the nominal essence of gold.

However, the

fact that a parcel of matter manifests these properties is

the result of its having a certain internal organization.

That organization is its real essence.

"The real essence

is the constitution of the insensible parts of that body,

on which those qualities and all other properties of gold
depend.

23
"

It happens that we do not know what this con-

stitution of insensible parts is.
ible, they are unknown.

Since they are insens-

Locke sometimes suggests that

scientists are com.ing closer to understanding the real essences of things.

We can,

I

think, suppose that he had

something like atomic structure in mind.

certain sensible properties of

a

In any event,

parcel of matter consti-

tute its nominal essence, and certain insensible properties

constitute its real essence, and the former depend upon or
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derive from the latter in some unspecified
way.

Though the real essences of substances are in
some
sense more fundamental than the nominal essences,
they

nevertheless appear to be had contingently by parcels
of
matter: "particular beings, considered barely in
themselves,

will be found to have all their qualities equally
essentially: and everything in each individual will be essential
to it; or which is more, nothing at all,"^^ and "there is

^^^i^idual parcel of matter to which any of these qualities are so annexed as to be essential to it or inseparable

from It."

Surely, in stating this extreme inessentialist

doctrine, Locke was going beyond the bounds of his own
theory.

A mass of matter must have, one would think, the

property of being composed of two or more atoms, the property of having some internal organization or other, and

various similar properties as well.

would wish to deny that.

I

do not think Locke

Rather, he ought to have said

that any particular real essence is not essential, or had

necessarily, by any mass of matter.

If the insensible

parts of a parcel of matter having one real essence are re-

arranged, then it may have a different real essence.
The expected theory of persistence
a

.

One might expect that

philosopher holding a view such as this would have the

following to say concerning persistence.

Individual sub-

stances, pieces of gold, cars, pens, are masses of matter
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whose parts are arranged

la

particular piece of gold

i<(,u:sist,

satisfy the persistence

Ci

certain ways.
a

In order that a

mass of matter must

iterion for masses of matter, and

it must retain whatever iiit.ernal constitution
is specific

to gold.

If the mass of matter loses that particular
in-

ternal constitution, it does not cease to exist, it
simply
ceases to have the properly of being gold (and various

others as well).

Masses mf matter can "out persist" the

individual substances they happen to be at any given time;
thus, the persistence criterion for masses of matter will
be weaker than that of any individual substances.

A problem for the expecto

.l

actually proposed does not

theor y.

The theory that Locke

have this feature, however.

After presenting his persistence criterion for masses of
matter, he says.
In the state of living creatures, their identity
depends not on a mass of the same particles, but
on something else.
I'or in them the variation in
great parcels of matter alters not the identity:
an oak growing from a plant to a great tree, and
then lopped, is still the same oak; and a colt
grown up to a horse, sometimes fat and sometimes
lean, is all the while' the saiTie horse: though in
both these cases, thci o may be a manifest change
of parts; so that truly they are not either of
them the same ma^sses
matter, though they be
truly one of them the same oak, and the other the
The rea:uni whereof is, that in these
same horse.
mass
of
two cases---a
a t ter and a living body
identity is not applied to the same thingT'2l3~
r.',

V-Je

had suggested

t

hat a theory of persistence con-

sistent with Locke's view-: about the ontological primacy
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of masses of matter would be one such that the
persistence

criteria for individual substances are subsumable under the

persistence criteria for masses of matter.

This much is

clear: taking "living things" to be organisms, organism.s do

not have to meet the persistence requirements that must be

met by masses of matter.

At first sight, one might think

that Locke intended his views concerning masses of matter
to apply only to inorganic things.

ficulties with this suggestion.
textual evidence for this.
to the contrary.

There are two main dif-

One is that there is no

In fact,

tliere is

much evidence

In the course of his discussion of real

and nominal essences, he refers equally to gold, men,
sheep, iron, etc.

Furthermore, adding the restriction re-

ferred to earlier, Locke's entire doctrine centers around
the assumption that the things having the properties that

constitute either

a real or a

those properties essentially.

nominal essence do not have
On the supposition that

masses of matter are the things having real and nominal
essences, this doctrine is at least initially intelligible.
As Locke said.

So if it be asked, whether it be essential to me
or any other particular corporeal being, to have
reason? I say, no; no more than it is essential
to this white thing I write on to have words on
it. 27

This implies that there is something that survives the loss
of rationality.

The thing that survives is not any longer
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a man,

but a corporeal being having an internal
constitu-

tion requisite to its being something other
than a man.

Strictly speaking, then, there should be just
one persistence criterion, that for masses of matter. What

we have

called persistence criteria for individual substances
would
.

simply state the conditions under which a persisting
mass
of matter continues to have the property of being
such and

such a substance, e.g., a man, a rock,

a

horse, etc.

The

stringency of Locke's persistence criterion for masses of
matter, however, does not provide the basis for such
theory.

a

Substances, organic or inorganic, gain and lose

parts, and those parts are, like the substances themselves,

masses of matter.

Thus, if Locke's persistence criterion

for masses of matter were the correct one, we would be left

with the conclusion that rocks, horses and the like do not

persist through changes in their parts.

Faced with this

problem, it seems that Locke should have reconsidered his

proffered persistence criterion for masses of matter.

But

this he did not do.

Two persistence criteria

.

Rather, as is demonstrated by

the above quoted passage, Locke makes the puzzling claim

that the persistence criterion for organisms is different

from the persistence criterion for masses of matter because
in the two cases,

thing."

"identity is not applied to the same

They are not different in the weak sense that the
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persistence criteria for organisms are instances of some
general persistence criterion for masses of matter.

They

are different in the strong sense that a thing existing
at

one time can be the same organism as a thing existing at

another while not being the same mass of matter.

The per-

sistence criterion for masses of matter is this:
(P25)

X at t is the same mass of matter as
y at t
(i)

X at t is a mass of matter;

mass of matter and (iii)
t iff z is a

(z)

(z

(ii)

iff

'

y at t'

is a

is a part of x at

part of y at t*).

Without yet attempting to state the complete persistence
criterion for organisms, at least this much is clear:
(P26)

O [x

at t is the same organism as y at t' and

(3z)

(z

is a part of x at t and

of y at t

'

3.

)

z

is not a part

]

Locke and Relative Identity

The ellipsis thesis and the relativization thesis

The

.

fact that Locke proposed different persistence criteria for

masses of matter and organisms is often taken to be evidence for the view that Locke thought identity to be relative.

Peter Geach, for instance, cites Locke as

a

precur-

sor, and Geach is perhaps the most vehement current

fender of relative identity.

de--

The view that identity is

relative consists of two major assumptions:

(1)

what

I

will
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call the "Ellipsis Thesis" and

(2)

what David Wiggins calls

the "Relativization Thesis.

The Ellipsis Thesis is this; any identity
statement
of the form 'x = y' is elliptical for a
statement of the

form

'x

^

y,' where

'f is

sortal or count noun.

a

puts it this way; "When one says
this,

I

'x is

Geach

identical with y,'

hold, is an incomplete expression; it is short
for

X the same A as y,' where

'A'

represents some count noun

understood from the context of utterance--or else it is
just a vague expression of a half-formed thought.
The Relativization Thesis can be formulated as follows;

0

(x

^

y and x

^

y and fa and fb and ga and gb)

That IS, though a thing a is the same F as a thing b, a may

not be the same G as b, where F and G are replaceable by
sortal predicates or count nouns.

The Relativization

Thesis should be distinguished from that which allows cases
of this sort; a is identical to b, and though a is an of-

ficial and b is an official, a is not the same official as
b,

where we understand this to be true only because, say,

a

is a deputy at t, but not a sheriff at t and b is a sheriff

at t' but not a deputy at

t'

,

though b was a deputy at

t.

Rather, it is a stronger thesis, one according to which

things may be identical relative to one sortal while failing to be so relative to another.

The import of these two theses can be illustrated
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in the following way:

suppose you hear someone saying that

Black Beauty was owned by Squire Gorden and
that Jack was
owned by Jerry and you ask, "Is Black Beauty
the same as

Jack?"

According to the relative identity view, this ques-

tion has various answers, depending upon which sortal
you
are understood to be suppressing in the expression
'the

same as.'

if you mean "Is Black Beauty the same horse as

Jack?," then the answer is 'yes.'

if you mean "Is Black

Beauty the same mass of matter as Jack?," the answer is
'no.'

Relative to some sortals. Black Beauty and Jack are

the same; relative to others, they are not.

In order that

Jack and Black Beauty be the same horse, there are certain

properties they must share.
mass of matter

must share.

,

In order that they be the same

there are certain other properties they

In determining sameness or identity, we must

take into account which sortal is in question.

One cannot,

as it were, point to a thing existing at one time and to a

thing existing at some other time, and ask, "Is this the
same thing as that?"

For, according to this view, the

question, in effect, makes no sense.

There are no unsort-

alized "things" to which one can refer, so one cannot ask

whether things are the same.

Rather than say that there is

a thing now on my desk having the properties of being a

book, being a diary, being a collection of pages, etc., we

say that a book is on my desk, a collection of pages is on
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my desk, and so on.

It is not clear exactly what
relation

the book bears to the collection of
pages
IS the collection of pages, where
the

coraposxtion)

,

'is'

(perhaps the book
is the

'is of

but, in any case, there is not a thing
that

is both a book and a collection of
pages.
li}e
_

case fo r^_Locke.

the horse,

Thus, when Locke says of the oak and

"truly they are not either one of them the same

masses of matter

,

though they be truly one of them the same

oak, and the other the same horse,

we should take him to

be affirming an instance of the Relativization Thesis.

The

persistence criteria for masses of matter and organisms are
different because masses of matter and organisms are different sorts of things

Further evidence that Locke advo-

.

cated the viev/ that identity is relative is found in his

assertion that, "such as is the idea belonging to that
name, such must be the identity.

one thing to be the same

"

s ubstance

For this reason, it is
,

another the same man,

and a third the same person, if person

,

man and substance

are three names standing for three different ideas.

If

indeed Locke believed that identity is relative, then it

should come as no surprise that we find him giving different persistence criteria for different sorts of things.
A problem for the case: the ontological primacy of atoms

and masses of matter

.

While ascribing to Locke the rela-

58

tive Identity view helps to explain these
passages, it is
not clear that it sheds any light on our
initial difficulty; the relationship between the persistence
criteria
for masses of matter and organisms given
that masses of

matter are ontologically prior to organisms.

If Locke is

indeed an adherent of the relative identity view, then
we

must take him, as has been noted, as holding that the persistence criteria are different because masses of matter
and organisms are different things.
a horse,

To take his example of

for instance, we cannot say that there is one

thing having various properties among them that of being

a

mass of matter essentially and a horse accidentally.
Rather, we must say there are many things, among them a

mass of matter and a horse.

We cannot then say that a

horse and a mass of matter are related in that a horse is
a mass of

matter with the internal organization requisite

to its being a horse.

The matter of interpretation is further complicated
by the fact that masses of matter do play an important role
in the persistence criterion Locke attempts to give for an

oak.

Though he doesn't suggest that for one oak to be the

same a particular mass of matter must retain the internal

organization requisite to oaks, he does say, "That being
then one plant which has such an organization of parts in
one coherent body, partaking of one common life, it contin-
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ues to be the same plant as long as it
partakes of the same
life, though that life be communicated
to new particles of

matter vitally united to the living plant, in a
like continued organization conformable to that sort of
plants.

This passage suggests that the persistence of an
organism
of a certain kind depends upon a succession of
masses of

matter sharing and maintaining whatever internal organization is requisite to organisms of that kind.

While we will

postpone for the moment an attempt at making this suggestion more clear, it should be apparent that the relative

identity view does not readily accommodate a theory according to which organisms are masses of matter.

That is, the

relative identity view, while allowing that an acorn and a
grov/n tree are the same oak but not the same mass of matter,

cannot admit that the oak is a mass of matter.

While

Locke's persistence criterion for masses of matter is in-

consistent with the view that there is some one persisting
mass of matter that is the oak, his persistence criterion
for oaks requires that, at each moment of the oak's exis-

tence, there is some mass of matter that is the oak.

An

adequate interpretation of Locke should take account of
this feature of his theory.

Another problem for the case: the role of the principles of
identity and diversity

.

Another difficulty that arises in

attributing the relative identity view to Locke is that of
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explaining away the fact that when Locke presented his
principles concerning spatia]. location and beginnings of
existence, he gave no hint that identity can only be de-

termined relative to some sortal.

Recall that he says,

"Another occasion the mind often takes of comparing is the
very being of things, when, considering anything as existing at any determined time and place

itself existing at another time
of identity and diversity

.

"

,

we compare it with

and thereon form the ideas

,

There is no suggestion here

that in comparing a thing at one time with itself at
another,

v/e

itself.

All of Locke's principles are readily formulable

are thinking of it only as being the same F as

in terms of strict identity, and,

in fact,

it is hard to

imagine how they v/ould accommodate the strictures of relative identity.

Douglas Odegard takes note of this fact and

attempts to argue that relative identity and ordinary

Leibniz identity are compatible.
undertaking.

36

This is an ambitious

Barring examples of the 'same official'

variety, the incompatibility of the Relativization Thesis
and Leibniz identity appears to be undeniable.

According

to Leibniz identity, a and b are identical just in case

they share all their properties.

vization Thesis, however,

a

According to the Relati-

can have the property of being

the same F as b, but not the same G, though surely b has

both the property of being the same F as b and that of
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being the same G as b.

How then does Odegard propose to

show that this is only an apparent incompatibility?
Ode gard

solution

's

.

Odegard indeed recognizes where the

purported incompatibility lies, and so he hopes to demonstrate that while the truth of
of 'a = b,' the truth of
of 'a

b.'

'a

^

'a

b'

^

b'

entails the truth

does not entail the truth

By way of arguing for this, Odegard asks us

to accept a stipulated use for 'same corpus'

such that a

and b are the same corpus if all their parts are the same
for

same body' such that a and b can be the same body

without having all the same parts.
the body

I

have now and the body

I

He then says,

"Thus,

had as a baby are the

same body but not the same corpus.

According to Odegard,

we can infer from the fact that his current body is the
same body as his infant body that his current body and his

infant body are, as he puts it, the same individual.
is,

from the fact that

a ~ b it

That

follows that a = b, where,

though Odegard is not clear about this,

a is

"Odegard 's infant body" and b by "Odegard

's

replaced by
current body."

Now, we might be inclined to think that we can in-

fer that a ^ b from a
b, in which case
^

v/e

would have re-

vealed the incompatibility of the Relativization Thesis and
Leibniz identity.

We are wrong, says Odegard, because

'a ^ b' has a number of implications, including
'a is a corpus,' 'b was a corpus,' 'a = b' and
Thus
'a and b have exactly the same parts.
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which can be read in such a way that it
thing presupposed or otherwise implied by 'a Q b' is false, is equivalent to
the
disjunction '~(a = b) v ~ (a is a corpus) v ~ (b
was a corpus) V ~ (a and b have exactly the same
parts)
and is true is any one disjunct is
0
a g b'

.

true.

.

.

'

-5

For this reason, he "can assert

'a

b'

^

on the grounds that

a and b do not have the same parts, without
having to

sacrifice

'a =

b.'"^^

O degard's mistake

carefully.

.

Let us examine Odegard's proposal more

Consistent with Odegard's line of reasoning,

the fact that Odegard's infant body

^

Odegard's current

body has the following implications:
(i)

Odegard's infant body has parts x, y,
(where

(ii)

at t^

z

is some time during Odegard's infancy),

Odegard's current body has parts q, r,

at t^

s

(where t^ is some recent or present time and
q, r,
(iii)

s

are distinct from x, y,

and

(v)

.

Odegard's infant body = Odegard's current body.

From Leibniz' Law and (iii)
(iv)

z)

we can infer:

Odegard's infant body has parts q,

r,

at t^.

s

Odegard's current body has parts x, y,

at t^.

z

But, now, Odegard asks us to suppose that the fact that

Odegard's infant body

^

Odegard's current body is a result

of the fact that Odegard's infant body and Odegard's cur-

rent body fail to have the same parts.
(vi)

'N/

That is:

Odegard's infant body has parts q,

r,

s

at t^.
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(vii)

Odegard's current body has parts
q,

r,

s

at t

c

’

However, it immediately becomes clear where
the trouble
lies.
(iii)

If Odegard wants to avoid "sacrificing"
the truth of
,

he cannot affirm that (vi)

ly contradicts

(iv)

,

is true.

For (vi) clear-

which was an implication of (iii) to-

gether with Leibniz' Law.

Odegard's mistake,

think, lies

I

in his failure to recognize that in order
to interpret the

expression

and b have exactly the same parts)" in such

(a

a way that it does not contradict

'a = b,

'

one must take

account of the fact that at any single time, a and b
must
have the same parts.
Identical.

If they don't, then they simply aren't

In short, we must conclude that a thing cannot

be identical to another by one criterion of identity, and

fail to be so on another.

To suggest otherwise is to deny

the truth of Leibniz' Law.

Since Locke's initial discussion of identity is

most plausibly construed as being about strict identity,
and his subsequent discussion is thought to be about relative identity, it is understandable that Odegard hoped to

show that the two do not exclude one another.
hov;ever,

We have seen,

that a person cannot consistently affirm both

doctrines

4.

An Alternative A c count of Locke's
Theory of Persistence

A sketch of the theory

.

I

think it is possible to recon-
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struct Locke's views in such

a

consistency can be avoided.

Furthermore, a view of iden-

way that the charge of in-

tity can be attributed to Locke which is
more in keeping

with other aspects of his philosophical system.

The pro-

posal is this: at the beginning of Locke's chapter
on

identity

,

we should take him to be stating identity cri-

teria for what he sometimes called 'real existences
--atoms,
'

masses of atoms, finite spirits and god.

Later in the

chapter, rather than suppose him to be talking about the

need to relativize identity, we should take him to be describing the relation that must hold between masses of

matter in order that they constitute a persisting substance
of a particular sort.

such relation.

For each sort, there v;ill be one

This persisting substance is, in some sense,

'less real' thaii the mass of matter that constitutes it.
In attempting to attribute to Locke a unified

theory of persistence, we ran into various difficulties.
Locke's views about the ontological primacy of atoms and

masses of matter in conjunction with his persistence criterion for masses of matter was not reconcilable with his

persistence criteria for living things (and, we supposed,
for inorganic things as well)

.

The supposition that Locke

thought identity to be relative serves only as a partial

conciliator; for on that view, the ontological status of
atoms and masses of matter remains

a

problem and

v/e

have no
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recourse but to dismiss Locke's apparent
adherence to ordinary Leibniz identity.
Our proposed alternative has an

advantage over its competitors in that it endorses
strict
identity provides a reading of the relative
identity pas,

sages consistent with the endorsement of strict
identity
and accommodates the ontological status assigned
to masses
of matter.

The status of atoms and masses of matter

.

We have already

seen some of the evidence for thinking that Locke held

atoms and masses of matter to be the ontologically fundarnsntal entities.

Masses or parcels of matter are the

things that have real and nominal essences.

Nominal es-

sences are "the standards to rank real existences into
sorts, as they agree with these patterns and to denominate

them accordingly."

Whether or not a parcel of matter is

to qualify as belonging to a particular species is, we

might say, a matter of convention.

The following passage

from Locke indicates the sense in which he took this to be
true:
It is evident that men make sorts of things.
For it being different essences alone that make
different species, it is plain that they who make

those abstract i^eas which are the nominal essences do thereby make the species, or sort.
Should there be a body found, having all the
other qualities of gold except malleableness, it
would no doubt be made a question whether it were
gold or not, i.e., whether it were of that species.
This could be determined only by that abstract
idea to which every one annexed the name gold: so
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that It would be true gold to him, and belong
that species, who included not malleableness to
in
his nominal essence, signified by the sound
gold;
and on the other side it would not be true
gold,
or of that species, to him who included malleableness in his specific idea.'^l
The internal organization of a particular mass of

matter ultimately determines its membership in a particular
species, though the nominal essence contains only sensible

properties.

it seem.s reasonable to suppose that the nomin-

al essence of,

for instance, the species horse not only in-

such properties as being four — legged, being a mammal, etc.

,

but also that of being such that it can gain and

lose parts.

It is, as Locke would put it, part of our idea

of a horse that it is something capable of gaining and

losing parts.

Presumably, the determination that such a

property is contained in the nominal essence of horses is
as much a matter of convention as the determination that

malleableness is nominally essential to gold.
Since the possession of a particular real essence

qualifies a mass of matter for membership in a particular
species, we can say that a horse, for instance, begins to

exist when a mass of matter takes on the organization re-

quisite to horses.

Under what circumstances does that par-

ticular horse continue to exist?

Given the persistence

criterion for masses of matter, we must say that the horse
continues to exist after the particular mass of matter in
which it began ceases to exist.

"Real existences" are
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subject to the identity criteria laid out by
Locke at the

beginning of his chapter on identity.

We suggested that

these were designed to serve as epistemic criteria,
though
they seem to be of limited utility.

They hold, says Locke,

"of every particle of matter, to which no addition
or sub-

traction of matter is made."*^^

This coincides with his

later statement of the persistence criterion for masses of

matter, which we formulated in (P25)

.

Real identity goes

hand in hand with real existences.
The status of organisms

.

The "less real" things, the

things that are "made by men,"^^ go hand in hand with something less than identity, something that, too, is made by
men.

Locke's discussion of the persistence criterion for

organisms is less than perspicacious; nevertheless it gives
us some idea what he had in mind.

A crucial feature of

organisms, as we have seen, is the possession of some real

essence or internal organization.

Using the example of a

plant, Locke says.

For this organization, being at any one instant
in any one collection of matter, is in that particular concrete distinguished from all other, and
that individual life, which existing constantly
from that moment both forwards and backwards, in
the same continuity of insensibly succeeding parts
united to the living body of the plant, it has that
identity which makes the same plant, and all the
parts of it, parts of the S6ime plant, during all the
time that they exist united in that continued organization, which is fit to convey that common life
to all the parts so united.

68

The following seems to capture the intent
of this

passage: On Day

1,

the parts of a mass of matter come to be

arranged in the manner requisite to a particular
sort of
plant.

Let us, for simplicity's sake, suppose there
are

three parts A, B and C and let us say that the
arrangement

requisite to the particular sort of plant can be described
as a three-place relation holding amongst the parts
A, B
and C. 45 VJe will call that relation 0.
On Day 2, A ac-

quires some new matter.
being.

Now, A'

,

A ceases to be and A' comes into

B and C stand in relation 0.

^^tter whose parts stand in relation 0 on Day

The mass of
2

is thus a

different mass of matter from that whose parts stood in relation O on Day

1.

On Day 3, B acquires some new matter,

so B ceases to exist and B' takes its place.

mains constant.
definitely.

Again, 0 re-

We can imagine this process continuing in-

Finally, it might well be the case that none

of the original matter remains.

Nevertheless, if the new

parts continue to stand in 0, the same plant remains.
The various masses of matter that successively pos-

sess the property of having parts that stand in relation 0

must in turn bear certain relations to one another.
holm's notion of "one compositum
seems to be on the same track.

Chis-

evolving from another"
A compositum,

for Chisholm,

is simply a thing having parts that is subject to Locke's

persistence criterion for masses of matter:
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Let us say that a given compositum N directly evolves from a certain compositum A provided
the following condition holds: N and A have some
parts in common; and N is that compositum which
directly results either from rearranging parts of
A, or from adding parts of A or from removing
parts of A.
if N is identical with A, then
N was evolved from A, and A has evolved from N.'^^
.

.

.

This analysis of direct evolution seems to specify

adequately the relation that A', B, C bears to A, B,

C.

But what of the relation that A’, B', C bears to A, B, C?

Here we can appeal to Chisholm's analysis of evolution: "a

composition N evolves from a compositum
N is a member of every class C such that

of C and

(2)

A, provided that:
(1)

A is a member

v;hatever directly evolves from anything that

is a member of C is also a member of C."^^

Borrowing from Chisholm, and stipulating that a
mass of matter has an 0-property if its parts bear 0 to
one another

(a

further restriction will be added shortly)

we can formulate the following persistence criterion for

organisms
(P27)

m at t constitutes the same organism as m' at
iff

(i)

m is a mass of matter;

of matter

(iii)

m'

(ii)

m.'

evolved from m and

t'

is a mass
(iv)

(30)

has 0

(0 is

an 0-property and m has 0 at t and m'

at t'

and any thing that evolves from m and from

which m' evolves also has

O)

For each kind of organism, there will be some organizational property unique to it.

In Lockean terms,

the organize-

tional property is the real essence of the
thing.

it is

reasonable to suppose that (P27) will hold of
inorganic
things as well; in fact, it will hold of those
things about

which we say that they can persist through changes in
their
parts.

For want of a better term, we can call such things

"Lockean objects," where we understand the term in such

way that it picks out Lockean sorts of things
horses, plants, watches and the like.

:

a

pieces of

With respect

to each of these, there will be an 0-property and so we get
a

generalized version of (P27)

(P28)

m at t constitutes the same Lockean object as m
at t' iff
a

(i)

m is a mass of matter;

mass of matter;

(iv)

and m

(30)
'

(0 is

.

m'

m'

is

evolved from m; and

an 0-property and m has 0 at t

has 0 at t

Lockean objects

(iii)

(ii)

'

)

What exactly is

a

Lockean object?

Per-

haps it is best construed as a set whose members are masses
of matter each of which possesses the 0-property unique to

objects of a particular kind.

masses m^

.

.

.

m^, then m

2

If the set consists of

directly evolved from

directly evolved from m and so on.
2

m^^

and m^

Since it is a matter

of convention which properties make up the nominal essence
of a thing and through the possession of a certain 0-

property results in a mass of matter having certain sensible properties that make up the nominal essence of a
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particular kind of plant, it might well have
been the case
that we had chosen other properties for the
nominaD.
es-

sence.

Had we done so, then that set of masses of
matter

would not qualify as

plant of that kind.

a

Thus, for every nominal essence there is some 0-

property unique to it.

However, it is not the case that

for every 0-property, there is some nominal essence unique
to it.

It might be the case that there is a set of evolv-

ing masses of matter, each member of which possesses some
O— property

,

and yet there is no nominal essence correspond-

ing to that 0-property

We should not want such a set to

.

qualify as a Lockean object.

Thus, we should understand

the term '0-property' in a more restricted way: a thing has
an 0-property just in case its parts bear 0 to one another

and there is some nominal essence corresponding to C.
(This more restrictive specification of an 0-property

should be used in (P27) and (P28) as well.)

We can then

define a Lockean object in this way:
(P29)

K is a Lockean object iff
m^^

.

.

m^^)

i

£ n

K is a set

of masses of matter;

.

an 0-property and
(1 £

(i)

—>

(m)

(Me

K

(ii)

m has

directly evolved from

0)

<m^
(30)

;

.

(O is

(iii)

or

.

.

(i)
m^^

=

.

Lockean objects are "less real," perhaps, for two
reasons:

(1)

we do not ordinarily- think of physical objects
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as being sets and

(2)

the fact that there is some nominal

essence corresponding to O is

a

matter of convention.

^h e application of Locke's theory to the roblem
of the
p

Ship of T heseus

.

(P28)

may supply us with an answer to the

puzzle involving our various ships.
(1)

We had two candidates:

the ship that was crowned with garlands in 399 B.C.

The garlanded ship based its claim on that fact that it was
the result of a gradual replacement of planks.

ship of the Hobbesian man.

(2)

the

The Hobbesian ship based its

claim on the fact that it shared its planks with the original ship.

On Locke's criterion, which ship is the same

ship as the ship Theseus sailed to Crete?

Well, it might

be thought that, again, both ships have equal claim.

Given

our definition of evolving, isn't it the case that each of
the masses of matter that constitute each ship can be said
to have evolved from the mass of matter that constituted

Theseus

'

property?

ship?

And that each of them has the relevant O-

Perhaps not.

Recall Locke's principles concern-

ing beginnings of existence

(P23)

and (P24).

According to

them, one thing cannot have two beginnings of existence.

On our new interpretation of Locke, we take these princi-

ples to apply only to real existences.
are real existences.
it might be claimed,

Masses of matter

With respect to the Hobbesian ship,
the mass of matter that constitutes

it is the very same mass of matter that constituted the
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original ship.

So, by our definition of evolving, the

former can be said to have evolved from the latter.

How-

ever, given Locke's persistence criterion for masses
of

matter, it should be clear that as soon as the first
plank
was lemoved from the original ship, the mass of matter
that

constituted the ship went out of existence.

And, given

Locke's principles about the beginnings of existence, it

might be said that very same mass of matter could not come
back into existence again.

So,

the two masses of matter

are not identical and so the one cannot be said to have

evolved from the other.

On the other hand, it is perhaps

better to interpret Locke's principles concerning the beginnings of existence in such a way that though the mass of

matter that constituted the original ship went out of
existence with the removal of the first plank, and though
it did not have a new beginning of existence when reas-

sembled by the Hobbesian man, it was reintroduced by the
Ilobbesian man.

Thus, the very same mass of matter, after a

series of intermediate evolvings

,

existed once again.

How-

ever, it should be clear that not every mass of matter that

evolved from the original ship and from which the ship of
the Hobbesian man evolved had the requisite 0-property.

Presumably, the 0-property that confers plankhood upon a

mass of matter is not the same as the 0-property that confers shiphood on a mass of matter-.

Thus, we seem to be

74

left with the conclusion that the
garlanded ship has won
the battle.

assessment of the theory

.

Clearly,

sistence principle in the sense that

a

(P28)

is not a per-

persistence prin-

ciple states the conditions under which
things existing at
different times are identical.
There is no identity here,
only an 0-property that is exemplified by evolving
masses
of matter.

But this should be seen as an advantage by the

Lockean interpreter.

We have an analysis that preserves

the ontological priority of masses of matter and does
not

force us to abandon Leibniz identity altogether.

Further-

more, it allows us to maintain a version of the Relativiza-

tion Thesis.

According to our interpretation of Locke,

statements of the form

interpreted as
and

b

'a

'a is

the same F as b' are to be

constitutes the same F as b,

stand for masses of matter, and

of object.

'F'

'

where

'a'

for some kind

Thus "a is the same ship as b" is to be inter-

preted as "the mass of matter
as the mass of matter b."

a

constitutes the same ship

If we suppose that a thing con-

stitutes itself, then this reading holds even when we re-

place

'F'

by 'mass of matter,' though masses of matter are

not objects in the Lockean sense.

In any event, we can now

understand statements such as "m is the same ship as m' but
not the same mass of matter" as meaning "m constitutes the
same ship as m' but m does not constitute the same mass of
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matter as m'."

Though the second conjunct amounts to the

denial of "m = m'," the first is not equivalent
to the

affirmation of "m = m'."
Statements of the form

'a = b'

should be inter-

preted in the following way: if such a statement
asserts
the identity of masses of matter existing at different
times, tnen it is true just in case the masses of matter

satisfy Locke's persistence criterion.

If, on the other

hand, the statement asserts something like 'the ship

Theseus sailed to Crete is identical to the ship that was

crowned with garJands in 399 B.C.'

(or makes any assertion

to the effect that Lockean objects existing at different

times are identical), then the statement is false, except,
where, as is not often the case, the relevant masses of

matter happen to be identical.
Our interpretation has its disadvantages, however,
for those interested in determining the truth about per-

sistence.

It is not clear that masses of matter should be

accorded the high ontological status given them by Locke,
and it is not clear just v;hat the ontological status of ob-

jects is supposed to be.

Furthermore, the theory depends

on the viability of various troublesome concepts.

As we

will see in the next chapter, the concept of evolution, for
instance, resists a coherent formulation.
Our interpretation of Locke does nevertheless
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provide us with a general strucl.ure
that some philosophers
have found useful in attempting Lo
deal with the problem of
persistence.
The general strucl.ure is this: There
is only
one "kind" of identity, namely, Leibniz
identity.
Leibniz
Identity does not hold between physical
objects existing at

different times, but rather some other relation
or relations hold.
These relations hold amongst things

that con-

stitute, stand in for, do duty for, physical
objects.
are, in a sense, more real than physical objects.

They

Our talk

about physical objects can be "reduced" to talk about the

relations holding amongst these things, in particular our
talk about

t.he

persistence of physical objects through

changes in the.ir parts.

Chisholm, the most vigorous con-

temporary defender of this sort of position, has attempted
to work about the details of such a view.

We can judge the

adequacy of his theory only by determining the extent to

which he is successful in working out its details and by

determining whether the theory billows some room for accommodating our ordinary intuitions about physical objects,
in particular about their persistence.
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CHAPTER

III

CHISHOLM ON PERSISTENCE
The Early Account

1.

B ishop Bu iaer's thesis

.

Chisholm's first published attempt

to deal with the problem of the Ship of Theseus
and others

like it occurs in his paper "The Loose and Popular and
the

Strict and Philosophical Senses of Identity."^

There, he

offers his own formulation and defense of Bishop Butler's
thesis that "when we say of a physical thing existing at
one time that it is identical with, or the same as, a

physical tiling existing at some other time ('this is the
same ship we traveled in before')," we are using the expres-

sion 'the same as' or 'identical with' in

popular sense.

'

some other time
fore')
a

,

a

'loose and

But when we say of a person existing at
('the ship has the same captain it had be-

we are using 'the same as' or 'identical with' in

'strict and philosophical sense.

Quine's doctrine of temporal parts

explain w’hat Chisholm's

.

(or Butler's)

Before attempting to
theory is, we should

be clear as to what he claims it isn't.

Chisholm offers

a

brief discussion of Quine views on Heraclitus' river problem.

Heraclitus, it seems, contended that one cannot bathe
80

81

the oame river twice since new waters
are always flowing in.

3

^

Presumably, this runs counter to our ordinary

intuitions about rivers and bathing, since,
as is the case
with ships and cars, we ordinarily assume
that rivers can

change (e.g., waters) and yet remain the same
river.

Quine

s

solution to this problem is that we view rivers

(and other physical things)

as processes through time.

These processes have 'temporal parts' that are 'stages'
of
a thing.

"The truth is that you can bathe in the same

river twice, but not in the same river stage.
Now, Chisholm is prepared to concede to Quine a

part of this view, but argues that the theory, taken in its
entirety, lacks the explanatory power that Quine attributes
to it.

Chisholm's concession is to the notion that per-

sisting things have temporal parts,

"I

think we may say,

though we need not say, that those things that persist

through time are made up of temporal parts.

Clearly,

this is a minor concession since Chisholm goes on to say

that he thinks it is a "category mistake" to say that

physical object is itself a process or event.

Chisholm has what he takes to be

a

a

However,

decisive cricitism of

Quine's view, namely, that in trying to solve the problem
of persistence through change by replacing persisting objects v/ith sums of temporal stages, Quine presupposes the

concept of persistence through time.

That is, since not
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all sums of river stages are rivers
9

(e.g.,

the Nile from

to 10 A.M., the Connecticut from
11 to 12 A.M. and the

Hudson from

1

to

2

P.M.), something more is required for a

sum of river stages to yield a river.
seems, must be a persisting thing.

That something, it

"We could say, of

course, that river stages a, b, c, occurring
or existing at

different times, are stages of the same river if and
only
if there is an x such that x is a river and such
that a, b,
c,

are stages of x."^

This clearly presupposes the concept

of a river persisting through time.

If we choose as our

reference point some other physical thing, say a river bed,
or river banks

,

we are again presupposing the concept of a

physical object persisting through time.
We could, then, move to some other ontological

category and say, for instance, that

given the concept of a person persisting through
time, we might be able to define a persisting river
in terms of river stages and accessibility to his
observations.
Or
given the concept of a
P-^ace persisting through time, we could say that a
sum of river stages makes up a river, provided its
elements all occupy the same place.
.

.

.

If we v/ere to do either of these things, however, we could

not expect to define the persistence of a person by refer-

ence to the persistence of his body, nor could we expect
to define the persistence of a place in terms of the per-

sistence of the physical things occupying it.

It is worth-

while to mention these last points of Chisholm's since they
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hint at what he takes to be at least
one criterion of an
adequate solution to the problems of Heraclitus
and his
river and Theseus and his ship.
in attempting to solve
these problems by eliminating the concept of
physical object persistence, one must not presuppose it.

Furthermore,

it seems clear from Chisholm's statement
about temporal

parts that he views them as providing little in the
way of

philosophical utility.

^

something persists through time,

then we can, if we choose, talk about the temporal parts
of
it,

but presumably everything we might want to say about it

can be said without reference to its temporal parts.

And

it is best to avoid talk of temporal parts since in doing

so we may be misled into thinking that they provide a solu.

tion to the problem of persistence.
Compos it

.

Q

What, then, is Chisholm's solution, as pre-

sented in "Senses of Identity," to the problem of persistence?

Chisholm first asks us to consider the things he

calls "composita."

A compositum is "anything that has a

part, in other words, if A is a compositum, then there is

something B such that B is

a

part of A."

9

Despite the

vagueness of the term 'part,' we can say that the relation
'part of'

is transitive, asymmetric and,

according to Chis-

holm, everything that is a part of something is such that

there is some other thing that is a part of it.

The fol-

lowing illustration will prove useful in our discussion.
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Figure
The picture in Figure

1

1.

represents

a

compositum,

though at this point we need not say anything more about

what it represents.
Hansel,

This compositum, let us call it

is composed of just x, y and z.

It is composed

other things that, in turn, are composed of just x,
y
and

z.

For instance, it is composed of that compositum

xy, which is x together with y.

And it is composed of yz,

that compositum which is y together with

z.

According to

Chisholm, however, the thing (if there be such a thing) xz
that is composed of x and

z

is not a part of Hansel,

for it

is not a compositum but is rather a mere con j unctivum.

Thus, xz is not a compositum for x and

together."

z

are not "joined

(Chisholm offers no criterion by means of which

composita can be distinguished from mere conjunctiva.

His

examples of composita involve things v/hose parts are fastened together in some way.

But it is clear that we are to

rely on our intuitioiis in this matter.)
To understand in what way Hansel is composed of, or

made up of x, y,

z,

however, Chisholm offers the following

principles of composition which are analogous to the con-
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cept of a decomposition introduced earlier
(Cl)

A

is.

:

entirely distinct from B provided there is

no X such that x is a part of A and x
is also a

part of
(C2)

B.

A is composed of B and C provided: B is a
part of
A;

C is part of A;

B is entirely distinct from C;

there is no part of A that is entirely dis~

tinct from both B and from
Thus, Hansel is composed of x, y and

z

because x, y and

z

are entirely distinct from one another and no part of

Hansel is entirely distinct from x, y and

Wed

Tut

Mon

Thu

Figure

Figure

2

z.

Pri

Sun

5ad:

2.

represents what Chisholm calls an 'evolving system

of composita.

12
'

removal of a part,

The change from
x.

(1)

The change from

the addition of a part w.

to

(2)

(2)

The change from

to

(3)

(2)

causes a new compositum, that composed of w,
come into being.

involves the

z,

to

involves
(3)

and y, to

This process continues through Sunday.

The concepts of evolution and direct evolution.

Having
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presented some important features of
these things he calls
composita, Chisholm then asks the following
question, "What
relation must obtain between two different
composita if
they go to make up the same physical thing?"^^
After all,
our initial concern was with the persistence
conditions for
things like ships and, so far, we have discussed
only com-

posita.

Chisholm's answer, briefly stated, is that in

order for the ship we see today to be the same ship
as the
ship

v/e

have
ure

saw yesterday, the compositum we see today must

evolved
2

from the compositum we saw yesterday.

represents a case of evolution.

Fig-

Chisholm character-

izes direct evolution this way:
(PI)

A composition N directly evolves from a composition A iff

(i)

N and A have parts in common;

(ii)

N is that compositum which directly results either

from rearranging parts of A, or from adding parts
of A, or from removing parts from A; or N is

identical to A. 14
Thus, referring to Figure 2, we see that compositum

(2)

directly evolves from compositum

(1)

and compositum

(3)

directly evolves from compositum

(2)

Compositum

viding the 'or' in (PI)

,

is not the exclusive

directly evolves from compositum

(1)

.

of the relation between compositum

(1)

positum until we get to compositum

(7)

(3)

'or,

pro-

also

The same holds true

and every other com-

Compositum

(7)

87

shares no parts with compositum (1), so it cannot
be said
to directly evolve from compositum

(1)

course, directly evolves from itself.

Each of then, of

.

As Chisholm notes,

it is often the case that when we encounter a ship
on two

different occasions, the compositum we encounter as the
second has not directly evolved from the compositum we en-

countered on the first.

For instance, supposing that, as

Chisholm puts it, in seeing a ship, we see first compositum
(1)

and then, later,

v/e

see compositum (7), we will not

have seen two composite, one of which directly evolved from
the other.

from (1).

Rather,

(7)

can be said merely to have evolved

Evolution, as distinct from direct evolution, is

as follows:
(P2)

A compositum. N evolves from a compositum A iff
N is a member of every class C such that:
is a member of C and

(ii)

C.

A

whatever directly

evolves from anything that is
also a member of

(i)

a

member of C is

15

Chisholm's concept of evolution is based on Frege's definition of the ancestral relation.

X6

Mr.

Jones is an an-

cestor of Mr. Schwartz provided that Mr. Jones is

a

member

of every class having as members Mr. Schwartz, Mr.

Schwartz's parents, their parents, their parents' parents,
and so on.

There will be more than one such class, since

there are ancestral classes whose, members include Mr.
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Schwartz and his sister Ms. Schwartz, or Mr.
Jones and his
friend Mr. Fork.
constit ution

.

How exactly does Chisholm use

the concept of evolution to develop his theory
of loose and

popular persistence?

\le

have seen that he assumes that, in

order that it be the case that we encounter the same ship
on two different occasions, the compositum we encountered
in the second must have evolved from the compositum we en-

countered on the first.

That, he says, is a necessary, but

not sufficient condition for sameness of ship.

We want to

know what it is for two different composita to make up or,
as Chisholm puts it,

"constitute" the same ship.

Utilizing Webster's definition of

a

ship ("a struc-

ture used for transportation in water"), Chisholm suggests
the following principle concerning the sameness of ships:
(P3)

Two composita, A and N, constitute the same ship
iff

(i)

A is a structure used for transportation

in water;

(ii)

N is a structure used for transpor-

tation in water; and (iii) every compositum B such
that B evolved from A and N evolved from B was also
a structure used for transportation in water.

Two points about ships

.

17

Chisholm now makes what he calls

"two rather different" points about the expression "the

same ship."

(i)

He concedes that

(P3)

is

"not entirely
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satisfactory.

He reasons as follows; not everything
that

qualifies as a ship is a structure used for
transportation
in water.
Some ships are used merely as models

or as deco-

rations, or simply never set sail at all.

But we will

never arrive at an entirely adequate characterization
because the expression "the same ship" is defeasible
.

This

meaus that "v/here there is a question of applicability,
the
proper authorities may lay down a convention,

a

convention

which is itself neither true nor false and which therefore
cannot be contradicted by any actual state of affairs.
(ii)

"The average Englishman" is, according to

Chisholm, a logical construction.
ship.

"

So, too,

is "the same

Just as talk about the average Englishman can be

"reduced" to talk about particular Englishmen, so can talk

about persisting physical things be reduced to talk about
the various composita that make them up.

"The ship is

'an

accident' of the various composita that served to make it
up.

,,19

The solution to the problem of the Ship of Theseus
ly,

.

Final-

it will be recalled that Chisholm began by suggesting

that the problem of the Ship of Theseus and others like it

could be solved by showing that a physical thing existing
at one time and a physical thing existing at another are

identical only in

a

'loose and popular sense.'

Now, ac-

cording to Chisholm, we have the machinery requisite to
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explaining just what that means.

He presents the follov/ing

diagram 20
.

A
B
C

D

E

F

Figure

Figure

3

3.

represents evolving composita.

is the one that was first launched.

which in turn evolved into both C and
and D into F.

dispute.

Tv;o

The compositum A

It evolved into B,
D.

C evolved into E,

people might engage in the following

One claims that the ship on the left is identical

to the one originally launched.

The other claims that the

ship on the right is identical to the one originally
launched.

How are we to judge the dispute?

Chisholm say;

The following points seem to me clear.
(1) Compositum E is not identical with compositum F; (2)
compositum E is not identical with compositum A;
(3) compositum F is not identical with compositum
A; (4) E and A belong to a system of composita,
namely ABCE, to which F does not belong; (5) F
and A belong to a system of composita, namely
ABDF, to which E does not belong; (6) both E and
F belong to a system of composita, namely ABCDEF,
to which A belongs; and (7) A belongs to a system
of composita, namely AB, to which neither E nor F
belongs

Given these points, and given that the disputants agree on
them, their dispute over the question whether the ship on

the left or the ship on the right is identical with the one
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originally launched is

a

dispute "nierely about words.

The dispute can be settled by agreeing on a
set of conventions.

If they agree on points

(1)

through (7), then their

dispute concerns only the loose and popular sense of identity

.

problems with the solution

.

Has Chisholm succeeded in

presenting a solution'to the problem of the Ship of Theseus?
It is not clear that he has.
(PI)

and (P2).

Let us begin by examining

One problem with

(Pi)

is that Chisholm

failed to specify the temporal order of direct evolution.

Referring to Figure

positum

(2)

(1)

directly evolve from compositum

(2).

after all, the result of adding a part, namely x, to

compositum (2).
posita

we shall have to say that while com-

directly evolves from compositum (1), so, too,

does compositum
It is,

2,

(2)

and

spply to (P2)

The same holds, mutatis mutandis
(3).

,

for com-

The same difficulty will, of course,

Compositum

directly from compositum

(2)

must be said to evolve

(3)

But there are more serious problems, ones that

emerge most clearly when we consider

(P3)

.

(P3)

tells us

the conditions under which two composite constitute the

same ship.
to

(P3)

It should first be mentioned that,

according

any two composite that bear no evolving relations

to one another but are both structures used for transporta-

tion in water will constitute the same ship.

Since there
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are no composita that evolved from one and
from which the
other evolved, clause (iii) of (P3) will be
satisfied.

This rather trivial problem can be remedied
by specifying

that the composita in question stand in some evolving
relation to one another.
ever, with

We have yet another problem, how-

(P3)

Figure

2

is an attempt to illustrate the sort of

case Chisholm had in mind.

But Figure

sents only part of the story.

actually repre-

2

There are other evolvings and

direct evolvings (even supposing that the temporal order is
specified) taking place.

positum

(2)

Not only, for instance, does com-

directly evolve from compositum (1), but,

surely, all the parts of compositum

(1)

(being themselves

composita) directly evolve from compositum

M on

Tue

Figure

Figure

4

(1)

4.

attempts to flesh out part of the picture of evo-

lution represented by Figure

2.

In the transition from

Monday to Tuesday, we not only have the direct evolution of

compositum

(2)

from compositum

(1)

,

evolution of the parts of compositum

but also the direct
(1)

,

the things
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labeled (in Figure

4)

as

,

(2a)

(2b)

,

and

,

(2c)

.

The same

phenomenon occurs in the transition from Tuesday to Wednesday and so on.

tum

(7)

Now, in order to determine whether composi-

(see Figure

evolved from compositum

2)

(1)

we see

,

whether it is a member of every class which is such that
compositum

(1)

is a member of that class and whatever di-

rectly evolves from anything that is a member of that class
is also a member of that class.

Thus, we construct class

A, which is a class of directly evolving composite:

Class A:

{(1), the parts of
(3)

the parts of

(1),
(3)

,

(2),
.

,

.

the parts of
(7)

(2),

the parts of

(7)}.
(P3)

tells us that the two composite constitute the same

ship provided that each is a structure used for transportation in water, and every compositum that evolved from the

"earlier" compositum and from which the "later" compositum

evolved is also a structure used for transportation in
water.

Presumably, we want it to be the case that composi-

tum

and compositum

(1)

(7)

constitute the same ship.

Re-

ferring to Class A, however, we see that the 'evolving system'

of composite fails to satisfy

pose that composita

(1)

through

(7)

(P3)

Even if we sup-

are structures used for

transportation in water, there are yet members of class A,
and thus composita that evolve from compositum

from which compositum

(7)

(1)

and

evolves, that are not themselves
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structures used for transportation
in water.
here are the various parts of

The culprits

coinposita

(1) through (7).
The existence of these stray
evolvers creates a problem
for (P3)

C hisholm's revis ^n: a new definition
j
of dirf^ nt

.

Chisholm, himself, in a slightly later
version of his first
paper, attempts to deal with this problem,
and with the
earlier mentioned one concerning the temporal
order of evo23
lution.
It seems that he takes the solution to
be that
of ruling out the possibility that the parts
of a compositum directly evolve from it.
^ evolves directly from y iff either x is identical

to y or there is no time at which x and
y both

exist but there is
at one time and
(P4)

z

z

such that

z

is a part of y

is a part of x at a later time.^"^

does indeed prevent us from saying that, for instance,

that part of compositum

from compositum
day

a

.

There is

(1)

a

(1)

we called

2,

time at v;hich compositum

(1)

and composi-

However, referring to

we see that (P4) also prevents us from saying

that compositum

since there is
Monday.

directly evolves

in the transition from Monday to Tues-

tum (la) both exist, namely, Monday.

Figure

(2a)

(2)

a

directly evolves from compositum

time at which they both exist, namely on

Similarly, compositum

from compositum

(1)

(2)

It does,

(3)

does not directly evolve

however, directly evolve
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from compositum (1), since there is
no time at which they
both exist, but they do have parts in
common.
The same

holds of the relationship between
compositum

positum (4).

(3)

and com-

The latter does not directly evolve from
the

former though it does directly evolve both
from compositum
(2) and from compositum (1)
We can focus, then, on two classes of evolving
com-

posite.

(6)

Presumably, the members of these classes form

evolving systems of composite.
Class B:

(7)
{Comp
(1), comp (3), comp (4), comp (5), comp

comp

,

(7)

}

and another that looks like this;

Class C:

(Comp (2), comp (4), comp (5), comp (6), comp
}.

Class B is that class containing compositum
those composite that evolve from it.
a

(1)

Compositum

and all
(2)

is not

member of Class B since it does not directly evolve from

compositum

(1)

,

nor from any other member of class B.

Class C contains compositum
that evolve from it.

(2)

Compositum

and all those composite
(3)

isn't a member of

Class C since it does not directly evolve from compositum
(2)

nor from any other member of Class

The failure of the revised definition
(P4)

.

C.

The peculiarity of

is most clearly brought out when we attempt to imple-

ment Chisholm's principle of ship constitution (P3).

V7e

96

wanted it to be the case that compos!
turn
(7)

constitute the same ship.

(2)

and compositum

(7)

and compositum

(1)

Presumably, too, compositum

constitute the same ship.

Now, we

have Class B, v;hich can be said to
contain the chain of
evolving composita that links compositum
(1) and compositum
(7)

Class C contains the chain of evolving
composita that

links compositum

(2)

and compositum

tant to notice a

fev/

things: the chain linking

does not include

(3).

tum

(1)

But it is impor-

(7)

and that

(7)

constitutes the same ship as does (7), compositum
not constitute the same ship as does compositum
(2)

and from which

evolves.

Compositum

Thus,

be said to yield two unsatisfactory results:
2,

(1)

does
since
(1)

(i)

(P4)

can

with re-

we see that there are strange gaps in

the system of evolvers.

compositum

(2)

(2)

neither evolves

(2)

nor directly evolves from compositum (1).

spect to Figure

(1)

is not a compositum that evolves from
(7)

(7)

Though we can suppose that composi-

constitutes the same ship as does

compositum

and

(1)

The ship that is constituted by

on Monday and compositum

(7)

on Sunday ap-

pears not to exist on Tuesday, though it exists on all the

other days.

The ship that is constituted by compositum

on Tuesday and by compositum

(7)

(2)

on Sunday appears not to

exist on Wednesday, though it exists on the other days.
And finally, it appears that there is

a

failure of what we

might call the 'transitivity of constitution,' since
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compositum

(1)

and compositum

and compositum
(2)

constitute the same ship

(7)

and compositum

ship, but compositum

(1)

(7)

constitute the same

and compositum

(2)

do not consti-

tute the same ship.

assessment o £_yTe__e_arly account
here is fairly clear.

.

What has gone wrong

when Chisholm first proposed his

definition of direct evolution, he seems to have
had in
mind the sort of case represented by any two
consecutive
pairs in Figure 2.
Evidence for this lies in his

own il-

lustration, namely, that of a child playing with
lettered

blocks
(1)

WECA

(2)

WEC

(3)

WECI

(4)

WICE

(5)

WECI

Figure
Chisholm, calls this an

5.

'evolving system of composita' and

characterizes it this way, "These various composita, each
of the lower ones being made from the one immediately above
It,

exemplify various types of change

..."

Thus, when

first introduced, the relation of direct evolution has two

important features:

(i)

if x directly evolves from y, then

X and y have parts in common and

(ii)

if x directly evolves
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from y, then y directly results from a
change in the parts
of X.
The first feature is reasonably straightforward.
The second, however, in conjunction with
phenomena such as

that represented in Figure

WEC directly evolves from

directly evolves from WEC.

5,

lead one to think that while

V7ECA,

WECI does not.

Rather, it

The change from WECA to WEC

involves one change, namely, subtraction of a part.

But

the change from WECA to WECI involves two changes, namely,

subtraction and addition.

We are led to believe that WECI

does not directly result from a change in

V7ECA.

Admittedly,

there is an ambiguity in Chisholm's original account of

evolution,
'or'

(PI)

.

We do not know whether we are to take the

in the second clause in its inclusive or exclusive

sense.

Chisholm's explanation of Figure

5,

however, lends

support to reading it in the exclusive sense.
Now, when Chisholm substitutes

ambiguity dissolves.

(P4)

(P4)

for

(PI)

,

the

emphasizes only the first fea-

ture of direct evolution, namely, the sharing of parts.
He illustrates the direct evolution of

different picture:

28

AB
BC
FB

CJ

FL

JH

Figure

6.

(P4)

by means of a
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He says.
’evolves'
in thTt-

is illustrated
IS continuous witli ab
in coiximon we may say,

^

therL?o

;

that the latter object BC 'dirLtly'
earlier object AB. Analogousof FB to BC, of FL to FB of
CJ In nr
°f
to AB
And since
FL direc-l'' evolved from
something
that
directly
evnWoH 9°"^
simply that FL evolved
from AB 2
,

.

Surely, there is

a

sense in which the sharing of

parts is the important feature
to emphasize.
The distinction between evolution and direct
evolution then becomes
one between cases where composita
share parts and cases
where they don t share parts but there
are part-sharing

composita linking them.

That is, presumably, the only dis-

tinction that really needs to be made.
ever, IS that
by

(P4)

The problem, how-

while ruling out the difficulty raised

'stray evolvers,' rules cut too much.

There are cases,

such as the transition from WECA to WEC and the
transition
from compositum

(1)

to compositum

as cases of direct evolution.

(2)

(P4)

that ought to count

gives us no way to in-

clude them in those evolving systems of composita to which
they seem, at least intuitively, to belong.

Clearly, it is

crucial that one be ^able to exclude stray evolvers from

whatever evolving system of composita one is trying to construct.

That is, referring to Figure

compositum

(la)

4,

it is clear that

is stray and ought not have a place in the

system of composita that serve to constitute the ship in

100

question.

positum

(2

But by exiling
)

since by (P4)

(la)

,

Chisholm also exiles com-

it fails to count as a direct

evolver from compositum (1).

it seems clear that, however

the relation of direct evolution is defined, it ought
to

hold both betv/een composite such as
(1)

and, say,

(1)

and

(2)

and between

In that way, the important distinction

(3)

between evolution and direct evolution can be preserved,

while allowing that in cases where there is mere removal of
direct evolution occurs.

a part,

Otherwise, we will find

ourselves with the troublesome phenomena that manifested
themselves in our consideration of
Figure

(P4)

in conjunction with

2.

2.

The Person and Object Account

Some general changes

.

Another attempt by Chisholm to

characterize the relation betv/een composite that serve to
constitute the same ship occurs in Person and Object

.

Various other changes have been made in his theory by this
time, and we will take note of those that are relevant to

the present discussion.

30

The things we have been refer-

ring to as 'composita' are now called 'genuine wholes.'

In

addition, the concepts of direct evolution and evolution
are replaced by the concepts of direct succession and suc-

cession.

This may be, in part, to dispel confusion raised

by the term evolution.

By the time of Person and Object

,
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Chisholm has made it clear that one
compositum or genuine
whole does not, after changing a
part,

come" another one.

"turn into" or "be-

He advocates a theory, one he
calls

mereological essentialism

,

"

according to which the parts

of a thing are essential to it.

Thus, when a thing loses a

part it goes out of existence.

The term "evolution" is

misleading on this score.
The concep ts of succession and direct
succession

.

In order

to do justice to Chisholm's new definitions,
yet another

picture is called for:^^
Mon

AB

Tue

BC

Wed

CD

Figure

Figure

7

7.

represents the

history of a very simple table. On Monday it came
into being when a certain thing A was joined with
a certain other thing B.
On Tuesday, A was detached from B and C was joined to B, these things
occurring in such a way that a table was to be
found during every moment of the process. And on
Wednesday B was detached from C and D was joined
with C, these things, too, occurring in such a way
that a table was to be found during every moment
of the process.
Let us suppose that no other
separating or joining occurred.
So,

Chisholm's concern here is to describe the relation be-

tween AB and BC

,

BC and DC, and AB and CD.

BC is a 'direct
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table successor of AB, CD is a direct table
successor of
BC, and CD is a table successor of AB.'
Direct table suecession is defined as follows (my numbering)
(

D1

)

X is

df.
a

a1;

direct table successor of y at

t a

t does not

(i)

table at

there is a

t
z,

begin before t';

table
4-

(Dl)

t'

=

x is

and y is a table at t'; and (iii)

such that

and is a part of y at

between

(ii)

t'

t'

z

,

is a part of x at t

and at every moment

and t, inclusive,

z

is itself a

34

tells us that the part

common, is itself a table.

z,

which both x and y have in

This assures us that, through-

out the process of change from y to x, a table will always
be found.

(Dl)

thus differs from Chisholm's earlier at-

tempts to define direct evolution in that, by insisting
that a table "be found during every moment of the process,"
the problem of stray evolvers that are not themselves

tables is obviated.

Thus, the relation of direct succes-

sion holds between composite or genuine wholes that are
tables.

It seems,

by specifying that the composite in

question are tables, to allow us to pick out just those

composite that are relevant to the determination of sameness of table.
The relation of table succession corresponds to the

relation of direct table succession in the same way that
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the relation of evolution
corresponds to that of direct

evolution
(D2)

X is at t a table successor
of y at t
(i)

t does not

table at

t

begin before t';

(ii)

x is a

and y is a table at t' and (iii) x

has at t every property P such that
P at t'

and

= df.

'

(a)

y has

all direct table successors of

(b)

anything having P have P.^^

Chisholm suggests that a "more intuitive" reading
of clause
(iii) might be: "x belongs at t to
every class C which
is

such that

(a)

y belongs to C at t

'

and

all direct table

(b)

successors of anything belonging to C belong to
C."^^
Th e new concept of constitution

.

(Dl)

and (D2)

,

in turn,

supply the concepts requisite to the formulation of (D3)

which specifies the conditions under which two composite

constitute the same physical object:
(D3)

X constitutes at t the sam.e successive table that
y constitutes at t

'

= df.

Either

(a)

X is at t a table successor of y at t'

x and only
,

or

(b)

and only y is at t’ a table successor of x at

Referring to Figure

1

,

(D3)

y
t.^"^

allows us to say that CD con-

stitutes the same successive table as AB

,

since, presumably,

CD is the sole table successor, on Wednesday, of AB.

But

let us now scrutinize these definitions more carefully.

The first thing that is noteworthy about (Dl)

is
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the fact that there are, at t, a
number of direct table
successors, of y at f.
Consider the table designated by
the expression "y at
y at t'
y at t

f."

There are, at

that are themselves tables.

f,

many parts of

Consider, for instance,

minus the left-most edge of
y at t', or y at t
minus the right-most edge of
According to Chisy at t
'

'

holm, each of those is itself a table.

Suppose that the

table designated by the expression "y at t'" looks
like
this

;

KIZ2\
y at t'

Figure

8.

Now, consider the table designated by the expression "x at
f’’:

Now,
a

according to (Dl)

,

the table pictured in Figure

direct table successor of y at

that t does not begin before t').,

t'

9

is

(supposing, of course,
x at t is a direct table
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successor of y at

t'

because there is a part of
y at

t'

that is also a part of x at t which
is itself a table

throughout the transition from

t’

to t.

That part,

is

z,

represented in Figure 10:

z

(at either t or t')

Figure 10.
The

persisting part,"

z,

is y at t minus a small piece of

its lower left-hand corner.

z

is also a part of x at t.

But, we can suppose, there is also a part of

us call it w, that is a part of
y at t

table.

'

z

at t',

let

and is itself a

That part, w, is represented in Figure 11:

w (at t or t

'

Figure 11.
The "persisting part," w, is

z

its upper left-hand corner.

w is also a part of y at

at t' minus a small part of
t

'

.

Thus, X at t itself is a direct table successor of y at t'.
It should be clear that there are many

ber?)

of proper parts of y at t'

(an infinite num-

that will qualify as
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direct table successors of
y at

f

since those proper parts

will themselves have proper parts that
are themselves
tables.
{D2)
or the 'more intuitive' reading, should
by
now be familiar.
Since membership in a class is atemporal,
however, and since, presumably, x and
y exist at times

other than t and t', clause (iii) of

(D2)

is better stated

without the temporal parameters given by Chisholm.
is,

That

clause (iii) should read: "x belongs to every class
C

such that

(a)

y belongs to C and

(b)

all direct table suc-

cessors of anything belonging to C beloncf to

C.

A problem with the new concept of constitutio n
can turn to a discussion of

seriously defective.

(D3)

.

Given (Dl)

.

,

"

Now
(D2)

,

we

is

Recall that according to (Dl), every

proper part of a table that itself has a proper part that
is a table qualifies as a direct table successor of that

table.

Thus, at t, there will be many direct table suc-

cessors of y at t

'

.

It is then not possible that x and y

constitute the same successive table.

It will never be the

case either that x and only x is at t a table successor of
y at t', or that y and only y is at t'

of X at t.
(Dl) 's

(Dl)

a

table successor

simply yields too many tables.

Though

extraneous tables are different from those we en-

countered in our discussion of (P1)-(P3), they nevertheless
serve as testimony that Chisholm has not yet characterized

adequately the relation that holds between two composita or
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genuine wholes that constitute the same physical
object.
But we can, perhaps, isolate the source of the
difficulty
created by (Dl)
In proposing

(Dl)

,

Chisholm is making the bizarre

assumption that "within" every table, there are many
others

which are proper parts of that table.

In describing

(Dl)

Chisholm says.
Thus z is a table which is a proper part of a
table.
(If v;e cut off a small part of a table,
we may still have a table left.
But if the thing
that is left is a table, then, since it was there
before, it was then a table that was a proper
part of a table.) 38
Thus, though

I

ordinarily suppose that when

I

sit where I'm

sitting now, I'm sitting at just one table, on the present
view, I'm actually sitting at many tables.

There are,

then, many more tables in this room now than might be sup-

posed.

The supposition that there are within every table

many others does, as we have seen, block the difficulties
we encountered with respect to Chisholm's earlier attempts
to define table succession

supposition was made.

(or evolution).

There, no such

But we have simply traded extraneous

evolvers for extraneous tables.

If supposing that within

every table there are lots of other tables provided

a

means

for explaining the relation in question, then we might be

willing to accept its unfortunate metaphysical consequences.
Since it doesn't, there is no reason to compromise our beliefs concerning the number of tables

(namely, one)

at
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v/hich I am now sitting.

which it m ight v;ork but doesn't

.

It

might be,

however, that (Dl) works for that
limited range of cases
in which tables do have proper
parts that are themselves
tables.
Take, for instance, the very long
banquet table at
which President Carter entertains
visiting dignitaries.
There is a decomposition of that table
into smaller
tables either because the banquet table
is made by fastening together other, smaller tables,
or because one could
'cut up'

the banquet table into smaller tables.

Let's

suppose it looks like this:

y at t

Figure 12.

When dinner is over, those in charge of tables at the White
House disassemble y.
at t,

is taken to the East Room, where,

it is joined with w to create a new table x^.

at t

•

Figure 13
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The new table,

since y at t

is a direct table successor
of y at t

and

at t have in conm^on a part,

z^, that

is itself a table and was
a table throughout its trip
from

the Dining Room to the East Room.

We can further suppose

that

and y constitute the same successive
table since
at t and only x^ is a (direct)
table successor of y at

t

.

So, Figures 12 and 13 illustrate
the kind of case for

which we need not make any untoward
ontological assumptions
W6 have no trouble granting that z^ is
a table
that is a

proper part of a table.
(Dl)

together with

results.

(D2)

Nevertheless, even in such cases,
and (D3) do not yield reasonable

We can depict the difficulty by means of Figure

14 and Figure 15.

Figure 14.

Figure 14, we can suppose, illustrates that table which was
also created by the men in charge of tables at the White

House after the disctssembly of y.

Another part of y,

namely z^, was joined together with v to create X
z^ was a table throughout the process.

2

at t.
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Figure 15.

Figure 15 illustrates a similar situation.

is the third

table created by the men in charge of tables at the White
House.

It was made by joining yet another part of
y,

namely
t

with u to create the table x^.

Now, we have at

three direct table successors to y at t'.

And since we

have three such direct table successors, we cannot say of
any of them that it constitutes the same successive table
as y at t

'

The new solution to the problem of the Ship of Theseus

.

It

should be recalled that Chisholm, in explaining the main

points of his theory of persistence, claims that expressions such as "is the same ship as" are defeasible, and

that judgments concerning the identity of physical objects

through time are a matter of convention.
Object

,

In Person and

he states his case this way.

If, from the point of view of our practical concerns the new thing that comes into being upon
the addition of parts is sufficiently similar to
the old one, then it is more convenient for us to
treat them as one than it is to take account of
This point could
the fact that they are diverse.
also be put by saying that such things as the Ship
of Theseus and indeed most familiar physical things
,

I

11.1

are leally fictions,' or as we
would say today
logical constructions 39

Chisholm presents his theory, it seems,
as
tion to problems like that of the
Ship of Theseus.

a

solu-

Though

judgments concerning the identity of ships
are, according
to that theory, conventional, it should
be clear that on
Chisholm's view, our conventions favor one
ship over the
other.
At least, Chisholm's conventions favor
one ship
over the other.
The definitions with which we have been

dealing attempt to capture the relationship between
those
various composita that are themselves ships, or that
are
linked by composita that are linked by composita that
are

themselves ships.
j

Adjusting the language of Person and O b-

ect to our present discussion, Chisholm is trying to iso-

late those cases of succession (or evolution) wherein we

find "a ship during every moment of the process."

Clearly,

then, it is Chisholm's view that our ship conventions would

yield the result that the ship that was crowned with garlands in 399 B.C.

(the ship of the replaced planks)

is the

same ship (constitutes the same ship) as the ship Theseus

sailed to Crete.

The ship of the Hobbesian man (the re-

assembled ship) is not the same ship as the ship Theseus
sailed to Crete, since we do not, in that case, find
during every moment of the process.

a ship

Presumably, were our

interests different, had we different 'practical concerns,'
our conventions concerning the identity of ships might
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yield the result that the ship of
the Hobbesian man is the
same ship as the ship Theseus sailed
to Crete.

if that

were so, then we would need a different
account of what it
IS for one compositum to constitute
the same ship as
another.

But Chisholm is assuming, and perhaps
he is right,

that, with respect to the problem of
the Ship of Theseus,

our sympathies lie with the ship crowned
with garlands in
399 B.C.

tity

We are more likely to accord the status of
iden-

(albeit loose and popular) to ships that are
linked

together by intermediate ships.

Doing so upholds, though

rather weakly, our notion that a gradual replacement of
parts is consistent with the preservation of identity.
any case, both

In

and (D3) come out in favor of the ship

(P3)

of the replaced planks.

The fission problem

It should be clear, however, that the

.

problem of the Ship of Theseus is not
forward fission.
sented by Figure

a case of

straight-

Straightforward fission cases are repre3,

and again in Figures 13, 14, and 15.

With respect to Figure

3,

Chisholm tells us that, in such

a

case, where we have two absolutely parallel evolving sys-

tems of composite; one that starts with A and goes off to
the right, and one that starts with A and goes off to the
left, the question whether the ship on the left or the ship

on the right is the same as the ship originally launched

can be settled by agreeing upon

a

set of conventions

(pro-
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vided there is agreement with respect to
the points (1)
through (7)).
Given (P3), and supposing that we have
found (PI) to be without fault, we would have
two composita
E and F, each with an equal claim to
constituting
the same

ship as the compositum

A,

Recall that

(P3)

was based on

the idea that one compositum constitutes the same
ship as

another when everything that evolved from the first and
into

the second was itself a ship.

Both E and F are

linked to A, we can suppose, in this way, so each of them
can be said to constitute the same ship as A.

Chisholm's

claims about convention should be seen as suggesting that,
in such cases we let concerns of a practical, or perhaps

legal, nature decide between the two.

It is presumably

possible that in certain bizarre cases, we might allow
that both E and F constitute the same ship as A.

But may-

be our conventions concerning loose and popular identity

cannot stray so far from the strict

aiid

philosophical.

An assessment of the Person and Object account

nitions presented in Person and Object

,

.

The defi-

however, run into

problems when we consider cases of fission (or, for that
matter, fusion).

Though they make an attempt to deal with

the stray evolvers we encountered in the earlier versions,
in doing so they lose sight of some of the problems with

which the theory was designed to deal.

We saw, by means of

Figures 12 through 15, that at least on one interpretation
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(D3)

does not even allow for the possibility
of fission.

One of the merits of a theory of loose
and popular identity
is its potential to account for such
cases.

If it doesn't

do so successfully, it is hard to see what
would move us
to adopt it.
It should further be recalled that,

as yet,

Chis-

holm has been unable to characterize successfully
the
fundamental relations presupposed by his theory, even for
the unproblematic cases.

This might be an indication that

further work needs to be done, or that those fundamental

relations are not there to be found.

Without them,

a

theory that looks good in theory, does not look so good in

practice
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CHAPTER

I

V

THE ORDINARY VIEW
1«

A Defense of the Ordinary View

The motivation for returning to the ordinary
view

.

The

theory that we attributed to Locke and the theory
proposed
by Chisholm have, as we have seen, various features
in com

mon

.

In order to solve the problems that appear
inherent

to the ordinary view that physical objects strictly per-

sist through changes in their parts, each of them denies
that strict identity holds between physical objects existing at different times and substitutes for strict identity

other relations that hold, not between physical objects as
we ordinarily think of them but rather between entities re

puted to be of a more fundamental sort.

Chisholm calls

these entities "composita" or "genuine wholes" and claims
that physical objects are logical constructions upon genuine wholes.

Locke calls these entities "masses of m.atter"

and claims, though certainly not explicitly, that physical

objects are sets whose members are masses of matter.

The

idea that strict identity does not hold betv;een physical

objects existing at different times thus seems to go hand
in hand with the idea that physical objects are not quite

what we ordinarily imagine them to be.
118
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Each of the theories that we have discussed
requires substantial changes in our ontological
presuppositions and neither theory is satisfactory in
detail.

Per-

haps, then, greater attention should be given
to the ordin-

ary view that each attempts to replace.

We have not, as

yet, encountered any argument against the ordinary
view

that is entirely persuasive.

That, coupled with the diffi-

culty of presenting a plausible alternative, enhances the

attraction of ordinary view.

It is, after all, the one we

seem, in the ordinary course of things, to hold.

So, at-

tempt will be made here to formulate the ordinary view in
a

reasonably careful way.

It can then be shown what sorts

of serious challenges it faces.

Physical objects

.

Though the Ordinary View was discussed

in Chapter I, it is worth reviewing the ways we normally

think things to be.

physical objects.

We think, for instance, that there are

Physical objects count among their num-

ber cars, ships, tables, planks, shoes and the like.

Some

people think that cows and sheep are physical objects, that

perhaps even persons are physical objects.

Others think

that only the bodies of persons, and only the bodies of

sheep and cows are physical objects.
are organic; some are inorganic.

artifacts, or products of man.
ducts of nature.

Some physical objects

Some physical objects are

Some are natural, or pro-
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Physical objects have properties.

properties of being brown, having

My car has the

four-cylinder engine,

a

having a half- full tank, having been shipped
from Sweden,
and many others.
It gains and loses properties.
Yesterday
it had a full tank but today it has only
a half-full tank.
Last week it was clean.

This week it is dirty.

Physical objects are thought to be made up of other

physical objects which serve as their parts.

Not every

collection of physical objects is itself a physical object.
My car is made up of an engine, a body, bumpers, tires,
seats and so forth.

But not every collection of tires,

seats, an engine and so forth is a car.

can gain and lose parts.

rusted out.

My car had one muffler, which

Now, it has a new one.

My car had an antenna,

until someone in Boston took it off.
fornia,

my car.

I

A physical object

If

l

moved to Cali-

would have to put an emission control system in
Now,

it doesn't have one.

These changes do not,

we want to say, threaten the persistence of my car.

There is another sort of change which does not seem
to threaten the persistence of a physical object.

That is

the change involved in disassembly and subsequent reassembly.

My grandmother's marble-topped table was disas-

sembled last year and the relevant parts (the legs, the

marble top, the wooden top upon which the marble top rests)
were put in a crate for shipping.

When the crate arrived.
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these pieces were reassembled.

My grandmother's table is

now in the bedroom upstairs.
T he Ship of Jlli eseus: the st o ry
told again

.

Why, then, do

we have to v/orry about the persistence
of physical objects
through changes in their parts? Why does
the problem of
the Ship of Theseus challenge our assumption
that they do
so persist? Doesn't the Ordinary View
have an answer to

the problem?

Let us reexamine the situation.

There is a ship in the harbor, the ship that

Theseus sailed to Crete.
by another.

A plank is removed, then replaced

We have, according to the Ordinary View, no

reason to doubt that the very same object remains after the
change as was there before it.
and then replaced.
399 B.C.

,

Another plank is removed

Again, we have no problem.

Finally, in

after numerous similar changes, the ship is

crowned with garlands.

The ship crowned with garlands is

composed of an entirely different set of planks from the
ship that Theseus sailed to Crete, but that causes no problem for the Ordinary View.

Since the identity of the ship

was preserved throughout each intermediate change, it was

preserved overall.

This situation is no different from the

many that we confront every day.
But, according to the story, we should not be so

confident in our judgments.

Another ship, it seems, has an

equal claim, namely the ship of the Hobbesian man.

That

I
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ship, with which we are by now all too familiar, appears

also in 399 B.C., composed entirely of the original planks.
So we have,
a ship

in 399 B.C.,

a ship composed of new planks, and

composed of the original planks.

Why does the ship

of the Hobbesian man have an equal claim to identity with

the ship Theseus sailed to Crete?
is supposed,

The situation here, it

is analogous to that of my grandmother's table.

We have, with respect to the ship, a case of disassembly

and reassembly.

If my grandmother's table can survive dis-

assembly, then why can't Theseus' ship?

And if it can,

then, clearly, we were overly hasty in our initial judg-

ment

.

We have here a case of conflicting principles.

In

our discussion of physical objects, it was claimed both
that physical objects can survive the replacement, the

gradual loss and gain of parts and that physical objects
can survive disassembly and reassembly.

If we are right,

however, then, with respect to Theseus' ship, we have too
Does that mean that we were wrong about

many survivors.

the survival capabilities of physical objects?

My grandmother's table: a new story.
my grandiTiother

'

s

table.

Let's look again at

Suppose that on April 13, 1978,

her table is sitting in her livingroom.

The m.oving men

take it apart and put the pieces in a packing box.

On

are put
April 20, the box arrives in Amherst and the pieces
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back together.

During the intervening week, my
grand-

mother's table did not exist, though
the pieces that had
been its parts did. My grandmother's

table came back into

existence (was reintroduced) on April
20.
At some point
during the process of disassembly, the
point at which there

ceased to be a table, my grandmother's
table
existence.

v;ent out of

At some point during the reassembly, the
point

at which there began to be a table, my
grandmother's table

came back into existence.

V7e

could speculate, if we wished

about what points they were (or, more likely,
what point
that was)
Had it been the case that the pieces
.

in the

packing box were never reassembled, but were used, say,
in
the construction of various things, then we would say
that

my grandmother's table went out of existence on April
13,
1978, never to return again.

survive disassembly.

So, physical objects don't

Rather, a physical object can be dis-

assembled and then later reassembled.

That is, there can

be gaps in the existence of a physical object.

Assembling and disassembling

.

We might say that the gaps

in the existence of physical objects provide us with a way

to distinguish what we might call complete disassembly from

partial disassembly.

A table comes to be completely dis-

assembled when we can say of the things that compose it
that none of them any longer composes

nothing now composes the table.

a

table and that

A table comes to be parti-
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ally disasscTiibled when
some parts have been removed
without
being replaced but we would
say of the remaining parts that
they still compose a table.
Complete disassembly, then,

produces either the end of, or
simply a gap in, a table's
existence.
Partial disassembly, on the other
hand, does
not
Partial disassembly is, however, another
way of
describing that situation we encounter
initially with
Theseus' ship.
when the first plank is removed, the ship
IS partially disassembled.

The plank that was discarded

was part of, but is no longer part
of, Theseus' ship.

The

same holds true, we can say, of each of
the other planks as
It IS discarded.

The planks differ, however, in an impor-

tant respect from the pieces of my grandmother's
table.

Though the pieces of my grandmother's table are
removed in
the process of disassembly, and are thus no longer
parts of

my grandmother's table, they cease to be parts of my
grand-

mother's table because her table, unlike Theseus' ship, no
longer exists.

Thus, the ship of the Hobbesian man appears

to be like my grandmother's table only when we ignore what
is going on elsewhere.

We should not, however, ignore what is going on

elsewhere.
us do,

If we suppose,

as the ordinary view would have

that partial disassembly does not destroy identity,

then the ship that Theseus sailed, to Crete persists at
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least until the time that it is crowned
with garlands in
399 B.C.

(Our story simply stops there.)

The fact that

the Hobbesian man constructs a ship out
of the planks that
first composed the Ship of Theseus should
not shake our

commitment to the already established identity.

Once we

have seen that the ship of the Hobbesian man
bears only

a

surface resemblance to my grandmother's table, its
status
as a serious competitor disappears.

The fact that it ap-

peared as a serious competitor is easy enough to understand.

One reason, the reason

v/e

have already explored, is

that there are cases of disassembly and reassembly where

identity is preserved.

The other is what might be termed

an epistemological reason.

Ship of Theseus in such

a

Chisholm tells the story of the
way that the planks of the ori-

ginal ship are replaced with aluminum ones.
B.C.

Thus, in 399

(supposing that there was aluminum in 399 B.C.) we

have two ships, one composed of aluminum and the other of
wood.

Now,

al ship,

a

if someone were shewn a picture of the origin-

picture of the aluminum ship and

a

picture of

the ship of the Hobbesian man, and were asked "Which of

these ships do you think is identical to v;hich?", it is

quite likely that he would reply, "Well, it must be that
this one

(pointing to the original ship) and that one

(pointing to the ship of the Hobbesian man) are identical."

After all, without any further information,

a

person would

be disinclined to think that
an aluminum ship could be the
very same as a wooden one.
Co burn on __tabj^.

Robert Coburn^ gives a similar sort of

case, one we can call The Problem
of the Table of Aunt Mabel
If we say that the table which
is in the hallway on Christmas day of 1943 is the
same table as
the one which was there on Christmas
day of 1970,
despite a long series of gradual changes,
then, if
we are asserting a relation of strict
identity, we
may find ourselves having to say, for
example, that
because the table that was in the hallway
on Christmas day 1943 was given to me by my Aunt
Mabel, the
hallway on Christmas day
1^70 was given to me by my Aunt Mabel--even
though
the table in the hallway on Christmas day in
1943
was a large, wooden table with beautifully
carved
designs and the table which was in the hallway on
Christmas day 1970 was a very small table with dented and rusty tubes for legs and a cheap plastic
top
with a hideous flov;er design imprinted upon it.^

Coburn is disturbed by The Problem of the Table of

Aunt Mabel just because it seems to undermine our intuitions about persistence through gradual change.

someone were shown

Again, if

picture of Aunt Mabel's table in 1943

a

and a picture of it in 1970, he might register disbelief

about their identity.

somewhat peculiar.

In at least one respect, this is

Consider the case of persons or, de-

pending upon your philosophical persuasions, the case of
human bodies.

Surely, if anything persists through gradual

change, human bodies do.

The bodies of small infants, and

the bodies of 50 year old men are considerably different.

The fact that we feel no uneasiness when shown a picture by
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grown up friend who says "This
is me when I was a baby"
seems to be a result of our
expectations concerning the ora

dinary development of human beings.
their bodies)

We expect people

(or

to grow, to wrinkle, to get
hairier in some

places, and less hairy in others, to
get flabby, and so on.
Dramatic, though gradual, changes in
tables are not, it
seems, quite so common.
But pointing to the aluminumlegged, plastic-topped table in the
hallway in 1970 and saying "That was once a beautiful table,"
or pointing to the

aluminum-planked ship, crowned with garlands, and
saying
"That was once sailed by Theseus to Crete" is
no

different,

fundamentally, from pointing to a 50 year old man
(or to
his body)

and saying "That once weighed eight pounds."

The

difference may come down to something like this: with respect to the changes that occur in normal human bodies,
there is always someone, the same someone, who has, as it
were, witnessed the changes and so can testify to having

persisted throughout them.

Ordinary physical objects

(if

persons are physical objects, they are at least not ordinary
physical objects) do not have that advantage.
in fact,

Sometimes,

there is simply no one around at all.

The odd consequences of the Ordinary View do not

appear deeply troublesome.

Surely, they are not alone suf-

ficient to persuade us that our judgment concerning the

identity of the various ships is faulty.

The ship of the
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Hobbesian man simply does not have
enough in its favor.
Sameness of planks (or any other decomposition)

is not suf-

ficient, as we saw in Chapter

I,

for identity.

The fact

that the planks that compose it are
those that first composed Theseus* ship mean that it has an
intimate tie with
that ship.
Many people might be more interested in looking
at it than they are in looking at the ship
that is in fact

identical to Theseus' ship.

its planks, after all, were

touched by Theseus while the planks of Theseus' ship,

ironically enough, were not.
2.

A Formulation of the Ordi nary View

Plantinga on the need for

a

mean between the extrem es

.

The

Ordinary View, then, in addition to presuming that physical
objects are real, presupposes that there is

a

mean between

two extremes of mereological essentialism and what Chis-

holm calls "complete, unbridled mereological inessentialism." 3

Mereological essentialism, as we have seen, is the

view that the parts of a thing are essential to it, and
that if y is ever a part of x, y will be a part of x as
long as x exists.^

Mereological inessentialism, in its

complete, unbridled form, is the view that for any whole w,

w could be made up of any two things whatsoever.

Surely,

the latter view is as absurd as Chisholm makes it out to
be.

His example, of this table here before me being made
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up of my left foot and the Grand
Central Station illustrates the point.
In the face of such odds,
mereological

essentialism seems an attractive alternative.

Plantinga

characterizes the situation this way:
But if MC [the Principle of Mereological
Changelessness] is thus intuitively plausible,
what is
the source of its attractiveness? Perhaps
its
generality and simplicity, coupled with the fact
that there are some mereological changes an
object
does not survive.
If l replace a tire on my automobile, we think the same automobile persists
through the change, acquiring a new part. But if
I replace the automobile on my tire,
the whole that
contains my tire is not the whole I began v/ith.
And of course there are many changes where it is
intuitively unclear whether we have to do with a
mereological alteration on the part of an enduring
object, or the substitution of one object for another °
.

Chisholm, himself, of course, opts for mereological

essentialism.

The difficulties he thereby avoids

(namely

those inherent in any attempt to find a mean between the
extremes) are matched, we have seen, by those he encounters
in defending mereological essentialism.

Plantinga, on the

other hand, considers Chisholm's route to be extreme.
seems

.

.

.

obvious that many objects

— human

"It

bodies, for

example--persist through small mereological changes: for
example, haircuts.

One would need a pov/erful argument,

I

think, to conclude otherwise." 7

Small mereological changes

.

The question is: just what

sort of changes are "small mereological changes"?

placement of a plank on

a

The re-

ship is a reasonably small change;
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the replacement of a ship on a plank
is a large change.

in

characterizing the Ordinary view, we distinguished,
albeit
loosely, between partial and complete
disassembly.
Through
partial disassembly an object retains its
identity; through
complete disassembly, it does not.
In discussing
these

concepts, an appeal was made to the notion of
a point in
the process of disassembly at which there ceased
to be a

table.

There was a table and there is now

tion of table parts.

a m.ere

collec-

Such a change is the sort some

philosophers call a "substantial change."

One problem, of

course, is that the loss of tablehood does not seem to be

connected to the removal of any particular part.

Tablehood

does not reside in some part such that the removal of that

part always accounts for the loss of tablehood.

Since it

doesn't, we must be able to locate the loss of tablehood

somewhere else.

But where might that be?

Let us, however,

return to ships in attempting to answer the more general

question

what sorts of changes are identity-preserving

changes?
Physical object properties

.

Recall that physical objects

are things such as tables, ships, cats and bicycles.

It

seems reasonable to suppose, then, that the things that are

physical objects have properties such as being
being a ship, and so on.

Properties.

a table,

Let us call those Physical Object

The Ordinary Viev/,

I

think, would hold that
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for any physical objects x and
y, if x is a ship at t and
X at t = y at t', then
y is a ship at t
In a more general form:
'

(PI)

D

(x) (y)

(x

at t = y at t' ->

object property

->

(P)

.

(p

is a physical

x has P at t and y has P at t')).

One way of trying to answer our question
is to try to

formulate more precisely the concepts to which
we appealed
in presenting the Ordinary View's view
concerning
Theseus'

ship.

We want to be able to say that changes involving

partial disassembly are identity preserving while
changes
involving complete disassembly aren't.

If

v/e

take off

some minimal part of a ship, say, a plank, the same
ship

persists.

But if we dismantle a ship, take it apart or

remove too many parts, it doesn't.

One problem that we

confront is the appropriate characterization of 'minimal
part.

Recall that, in Chapter

I,

when an attempt was made

to formulate the notion of a gradual change, we ran into a

similar problem.
semblance.

There, we appealed to the concept of re-

A change is gradual if the replacement part

resembles the replaced part.

But the change that occurs

when we supposed that Jason replaced all but one oarlock of
his ship with Theseu's' ship minus one oarlock turns out,
then, to be gradual.

But we wouldn't want to say that the

ship Jason now has is identical to the ship he had before
the change.

The part he is replacing, it seems, is too big.
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Pny sical ob j ects -j^vai;^g

.

in order to circumvent dif-

ficulties such as these, we can invoke
the concept of a
phyoical object-in-waiting
We actually encountered
these things in our discussion of
Chisholm's definition of
direct table succession.
Chisholm there presupposed that
.

tables have proper parts that are themselves
tables.

Rather than agreeing to that, we can say that
every table
has various tables-in-waiting relative to
it.
A table-in-

waiting is a set of table parts.
set of ship parts.

A ship-in-waiting is a

But these sets have certain distin-

guishing characteristics.
(P2)

K is a physical ob ject-in-waiti.ng relative to

X at t =df

.

(3D)

at t and K C D)

{

(D is a

and

Ow)

[

decomposition of x
(w is

possible world

a

and K is a decomposition of x in w) and

(P)

(p

is a Physical Object Property and x has P at
X has P in w)

t

]

}

Take the ship Hansel that is composed of various parts
(under some decomposition)

a,

b,

c on

{a,b} is a subset of the set {a,b,c}.

Monday.

The set

The set {a,b} is a

ship-in-waiting relative to Hansel on Monday just in case
there

'

s

a possible world in which {a,b} is a decomposition

of Hansel.

Speaking loosely, we can say that, on Monday,

Hansel has a part p such that if someone were to remove

another part p', p would then be

a ship.

In fact, speaking
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loosely, p would be Hansel.

parts such as

Ships can survive the loss of

p'

because they have parts such as
p that
carry them through the change.
Jason's ship undergoes
a

such

change, though it is described in a somewhat
misleading

fashion.
it,

Jason's ship has

a

ship-in-waiting relative to

namely, the set whose members are the parts
of Jason's

ship (under some decomposition) minus one
oarlock.

When

the oarlock is removed on Tuesday that set
becomes a de-

composition of Jason's ship.

it is simply a typical case

of a ship losing a part and surviving that loss.

characterize such
(P3)

a

We can

loss in this way:

X loses a part at t iff

(3K)

physical

(K is a

object-in-waiting relative to x at

t

'

<

t and

K is a decomposition of x at t)

Take again the ship Hansel.
of two parts a and b.

On Tuesday, Hansel is composed

If a part c is added to Hansel on

Wednesday, then on Wednesday, the set {a,b,c} is a de-

composition of Hansel.

The set {a,b} then becomes a ship-

in-waiting relative to Hansel.

Speaking loosely, we can

say that when an object gains a part and survives the gain
it is transformed into an object-in-waiting.

When the oar-

lock is removed from Jason's ship and put on Theseus' ship,
the set whose members are the parts of Theseus

'

ship minus

its oarlock ceases to be a decomposition of Theseus

'

ship

and instead becomes a ship-in-waiting relative to Theseus'
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ship.

We can characterize identity
preserving gain of a
part this way:
(P4)

X gains a part at t iff

of X at t'

<

(3K)

t and K is a

waiting relative to x at

(K

is a decomposition

physical object-int)

^sembling and disassembling: some definitions

Earlier we

.

said that physical objects can survive partial
disassembly
but cannot survive complete disassembly.

Having been com-

pletely disassembled, however, an object can be reassembled.
Partial disassembly is simply the loss of a part.
(P5)

X is partially disassembled at t iff x loses a

part at

t.

Complete disassembly occurs, on the other hand, when an
object is taken apart in such

may remain, it doesn't.

a

way that though its parts

We might say that a ship can be

partially disassembled up until that point when it has no
more ships-in-waiting relative to it.

Though there are

ship parts remaining, none of them has a decomposition that
is a ship-in-waiting relative to the ship that is being

disassembled.

After that point, the ship has come to be

completely disassembled.
(P6)

X is completely disassembled at t iff
a

decomposition of x at

and y exists at

t)

“>

~

t'

(3K)

<

(K

t)

and

(3 d)

(y)

[

{

(D is

(y G

D

is a decomposition of
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y and K was a physical object-in-waiting
rela-

tive to X at

t

'

}

)

.

Finally, an object comes to be
partially reassembled when
it has the same Physical Object
Properties it had before
disassembly and when its decomposition is
that of one of
its earlier physical objects-in-waiting.
(P7)

X is partially reassembled at t
iff

(at')

[(t'

t

<

and X was completely disassembled at t')
and (3K)
(K

was a physical object-in-waiting relative
to x

at t'
(P

and K is a decomposition of x at

and

t)

(P)

is a Physical Object Property and x had P
at t'

-:>x

has P at

t)

]

.

An object is completely reassembled when its
decomposition
IS the same as its decomposition before disassembly
and it

shares with its former self all Physical Object Properties.
(P8)

X is completely reassembled at t iff

(3t')

[(t'

t and X

was completely disassembled at t') and

(3D)

was a decomposition of x at

a

(D

decomposition of x at

t)

and

(P)

t'
(P

cal Object Property and x had P at t
at t)

and D is
is a Physi-

'

x has P

]

My grandm.other

'

assembled for shipping.
never was.

<

Each time

And each time

a

a

s

table, then, was completely dis-

Theseus' ship, on the other hand,

plank was removed, it lost

new plank was added, it gained

a part.

a part.

But
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It survived each of those
changes.
^

since the ship that

gained and lost parts persisted
throughout those changes,
then the ship of the Hobbesian
man, though it shares a
decomposition with Theseus' ship on its
first day of existGncG, cannot bG thG samG ship.

I

I

,

I

I

I

T hG fission pro blGm ag aj^.

Though thG concGpt of a physi-

cal objGct-in-waiting may help us in
attempting to characterize the metaphysical principles underlying
the Ordinary

View's view of the problem of the Ship of
Theseus, it may
be thought inadequate in another, related
area.
The problem of the Ship of Theseus appears initially
to be a prob-

I

lem of fission.

,

end with

j

tv;o.

We start, as it were, with one thing and
The concept of a physical object-in-waiting

I

is helpful largely because it helps to explain just
how one

of those two things can be eliminated.

I

us to explain that,

That is, it helps

in fact, the problem of the Ship of

Theseus is not a problem of fission after all.

Indeed, it

j

may not be.
{

But could there not be cases of genuine fis-

sion?'’
!

According to the Ordinary View,
I

j

4

a

physical object

can gain and lose parts and persist through those changes.

A physical object doesn't persist through complete disassembly, though it can be reassembled.
lie somewhere in between.

Fission seems to

Suppose that we have

Fritz that is composed on Monday of

tv;o

a ship

principal parts x
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and y

(that is, there is a decomposition
of Fritz on Mon
day into x and y)
The ship looks like this:
.

Fritz on Monday

Figure

1.

On Tuesday, Fritz, as Chisholm likes
to describe such

phenomena, goes off in two different directions.

Fritz on Monday

Hansel and Gretel
on Tuesday

Figure

2.

Both X and y seemed to be, on Monday, ships-in-waiting

relative to Fritz.

That is, x and y can each be said to

be "shippy" enough that Fritz might be composed just of x
in some world or of y in some world.

When Fritz goes off

in two different directions on Tuesday, we call the result-

ing objects "Hansel"
y)

.

(the part x)

and "Gretel"

(the part

Hansel and Gretel are equal in all relevant respects:
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they a.e the same size, have
the same shippy properties,
and so on.
The question is, of course,
whether either
Hansel or Gretel is identical
to Fritz.
Has Fritz persisted, or has Fritz disappeared?
It should be clear that not
both Hansel and Gretel

can be identical to Fritz.

So,

let us consider Hansel.

If

Hansel is identical to Fritz, then we
should describe the
situation as Fritz losing a part, namely
y.

Thus, Fritz

was composed of x and
y on Monday and is composed just of x
on luesday.
Unfortunately, however, the same reasoning

applies with respect to Gretel.

On Monday, Fritz was com-

posed of X and y and Tuesday Fritz is composed
just of

y.

Since Hansel and Gretel are equal in all relevant
respects,
there seems to be nothing we might bring to bear in
deciding between the two.
j

Neither, however, can we say that Fritz was com-

pletely disassembled on Tuesday.

Complete disassembly re-

quires that speaking loosely, none of the remaining parts
was a ship-in-waiting relative to Fritz before disassembly.
But we have already granted that each of them is.

seems that Fritz has not disappeared.

So,

it

What, then, can a

proponent of the Ordinary View say about this sort of case?
The Ordinary View's solution to the fission problem
;

i

!i

Re-

call that, at the end of Chapter I, we discussed Chisholm's

reasons for claiming that there is
j

I

.

a

disanalogy between
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personal identity and physical object
identity.

The dis-

analogy lies in the reputed fact that, with
respect to
physical object fission cases, we can imagine
that
the

matter could be settled by appealing to a high
authority
whereas no such appeal would help in person
fission

cases.

The fact that a high authority could settle
the matter with

ships shows that ships do not strictly persist
through
changes.

Since the high authority's decision could go

either way
sue.

,

it must be that strict identity is not at is-

Ships persist, then, only in a loose and popular

sense
Fritz and Hansel and Gretel present us with just
the sort of case that warrants, according to Chisholm, an

appeal to authority.

The captain of Fritz needs to know

which ship. Hansel or Gretel, he is to command.
means do not yield a result.
Chapter

I,

The usual

We can imagine, as we did in

that this is just the moment at vjhich the Cap-

tain of Fritz would be justified in going to the authorities in charge of ships.

Suppose that the authorities de-

cide in favor of Hansel.

They must decide, it seems, on

reasonably arbitrary grounds, since Hansel and Gretel are
alike in all relevant respects.

Perhaps the authorities

would flip a coin, perhaps they would decide that they prefer Hansel's present spot in the harbor.

any event, would be off the hook.

The Captain, in

It seems possible, how-
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ever, that the authorities
might be wrong about which ship
is, in fact, identical to
Fritz.
But that doesn't matter.
The ownership or captainship claims
that are made with
respect to ships are, if anything is,
conventional.
So,

conventional "identity" serves our purposes
in such a case.
The captain need not worry further,
unless he has inclinations of the philosophical sort, which
one is really identical.

Such a case appears no different from the
person

fission case that Chisholm offers.

About that case he

says

There may be no sufficient reason at all for deciding that you are or you are not one or the other
of the two different persons.
But from this it
does not follow that you will not in fact be one
or the other of the two persons.
The lack of a criterion for deciding between the two does

not sway his conviction that personal identity is strict
identity.

We can,

I

think, stand just as firm with respect

to physical object identity.

The lack of a criterion only

shov;s that there are some cases about

certain.

It does not show,

which we cannot be

any more than it does for per-

sonal identity, that we must abandon strict identity altogether.

We need only abandon it in a very limited sense:

cases of genuine fission may call for

a

judgment.

That

judgment will presumably be based on considerations of convention.

Since that is so, we may find ourselves calling
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Hansel the same ship as Fritz
when, in fact, it isn't
the same.

That demonstrates the extent to
which we
can, in the ordinary course of
things, do without
philo--

sophical certainty.

To make more of it is to make too
much

of it

^

Assessment of the Ordinary Vi ew

AJ^in^that there _i s trouble

The preceding account of the

.

Ordinary View has its merits.

It provides a fuller account

of the principles to v/hich we appealed
in Chapter

I

and it

further provides a means for understanding more
fully the

relationship betv;een the metaphysical and epistemological
issues raised by the problem of persistence.

On closer

examination, however, it can be seen to rest on very shaky
ground.

Lying beneath it is

a

confusion that calls into

question the consistency of our ordinary beliefs concerning
the persistence conditions of physical objects.

It should

be obvious that, in presenting our account of the Ordinary
View, no attempt was made to elucidate the notion of

Physical Object Property.

quires such an elucidation.

a

The viability of the theory reTo attempt to do so, however,

is to reveal the nature of the confusion just alluded to.

Physical object properties again: are they essential prope rties?

When the concept of a Physical Object Property was

first introduced, a principle concerning such properties
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was suggested.

That principle (PI)

Object Properties are omnitemporal.

,

entails that Physical
That is, for any

Physical Object Property F, if x has
F at
at any time at which x exists.

t,

then x has F

The property of being a

table would seem to be a prime
candidate for a Physical Object Property.
If x is a table at t, and x exists
at t' 7^
t,

then X is a table at

f.

We know, then, that if

a

thing

X is a table at t and a thing
y is not a table at t'

t,

then X and y are not identical.

The obvious question that arises at this
point is

whether Physical Object Properties are essential
to che
things that have them.
That is, for any Physical Object

Property F, is it true that if x has F, then x has F in
any v;orld in which x exists?

Might something that is

a

table in this world be a cat in some other world (supposing, of course, that being a cat is a Physical Object

Property)?

More precisely, might something that is

in this world,
a

We would be inclined, it seems, to

If Physical Object Properties are essential,

however, we are faced with a serious difficulty.
the following table, Maude.

which we

table

exist in some other world and yet fail to be

table in that world?

think not.

a

v;ill

call "here."

Consider

Maude exists in this world,

Maude here at

Figure

t

3.

At some time t, Maude is composed of
x and y.
That
IS, there is a decomposition D of
Maude at t and D = {x,y}.
We might wish to know whether there is a
subset of D that

qualifies as a table-in-waiting relative to Maude
at
The set having y as a member seems a likely
prospect.
K =
t,

{y}.

t.

Let

If K is a table-in-waiting relative to Maude
at

then, according to (P2), K is a decomposition of Maude

in some possible world and in that world Maude has
every

Physical Object Property that she has here.

(If Physical

Object Properties are essential, then this latter condition
is superfluous.)

If K is a decomposition of Maude in some

possible world w, then Maude looks like this in w:

Maude in w

Maude in w is composed of

y.

That is all there is

to Maude
a

table

If y is all there is to Maude
in w, and Maude is
in,

w,

then y niust be a table in w.

But if y is a

table in w, and if Physical Object
Properties are essential, then y is a table here.
Here, y is a table that is a
proper part of a table.
It is not simply a would-be table,
It IS an actual table.

cept of

a

Recall that in introducing the con-

physical object-in-waiting, we claimed to be

avoiding just such a commitment.

We can, of course, deny

that the property of being a table is essential.

must grant that what is

a

one in some other world.

Then, we

table in this world fails to be
In some other world, it's a cat.

;^other argument against persistence

Whether or not

.

Physical Object Properties are essential, however, our discussion of that issue touched upon one even more troubling.

Following Maude from here to w, we found that something
that was merely a part of Maude here is no longer

Maude in

v;.

In w, that part

Maude.

a

part of

Our characteriza-

tion (P2) of a physical object-in-waiting hides that fact

behind the veil of decompositions.

If y

Maude in w, and

if we assume that identity is a relation that holds of

necessity, then y is Maude here.

A glance at Figure

however, shows that this is not so.
thing composed of x and y.

posed of X and

y.

3,

Here, Maude is the

Surely, y is not the thing com-

So, y isn't Maude here.

But, coming

back around, if y isn't Maude here, then y can't be Maude

in w.
(Al)

This line of reasoning is made
explicit by (Al)
1.

y = Maude,

2.

Maude = the thing composed of x and
y, here
the thing composed of x and
here

3.

in w

y = Maude,

here

y

4.

y

5.

y

y,

Maude, here

7^

Maude, in w.

Two tro u bling consequences of the argumen t.

If,

hov/ever,

Maude and y are not identical in w, we are left with
two
problems.

The first can be illustrated by a picture that

resembles Figures

3

and

4

in many important respects:

Maude at t

Maude at
Figure

Figure

5

t

'

>

t

5.

represents an ordinary case of a table losing

small part.

(P3)

,

which states the conditions under

a

v;hich

something loses a part, was supposed to entail that the
thing in question survives the change.

A table loses

a

part when a set that was a table-in-waiting relative to it

becomes its own decomposition.

It should be clear now that

such a phenomenon occurs only when something that was a

table becomes the table itself.
t.

At

t'

,

y is Maude.

(Al)

y was a part of Maude at

would seem, mutatis mutandis
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to apply here as well.

after all.

if

(a 1)

applies, then y isn't Maude

But what, then, is Maude?

We supposed that

Maude was going to persist through
the loss of x, and yet
It seems that she hasn't.
Or if she

has, it is not at all

easy to see, given that she isn't
y, what she is.
The second problem arises in attempting
to solve
the first.
Suppose that we say that, indeed,
y and Maude
are not identical in w.
They aren't identical here, so
they aren't identical there (or anywhere
else).
But if
Maude exists in w and is not identical to
y, it is still
true that Maude and y have a great deal in
common.
share, for example, every decomposition.

exactly the same parts.

They

Maude and y have

If so, we must affirm the follow-

ing principle:
(P9)

O

(3x) (3y) (3t)

at t
(P9)

D)

(

(D

is a decomposition of x

D is a decomposition of y at t and x

E

y)

.

should be distinguished from another principle that we

affirmed in presenting the Ordinary View.
(PIO)

O Ox)

(3y) (3t)

Ot')

(3D)

(D is

a

decomposition

of X at t and D is a decomposition of y at t',
t

(PIO)

^

'

7

t and X

7^

y

)

.

was presupposed by our assertion that the ship that

Theseus sailed to Crete and the ship of the Hobbesian man,
though they share a decomposition into planks, are not
identical.

(P9)

presents a far greater challenge.

Accord-

14

7

ing to It, two different things
can share all their parts
at one and the same time.

QnejrLQ£g_t^^

consequent.

Equally troublesome re-

sults appear with respect to properties.

Maude, if she

exists in w, shares many properties with
y.
table, and so is y.
Whatever color Maude

Maude is a

is, y is that

color, too.

Wherever Maude is, y is also there.

In fact,

the only properties that might be called
into service to

distinguish Maude from y are various modal properties.
Maude exists in
as a part here.

v;,

If

then Maude has the property of having x

y does not have that property.

Maude has

the property of having y as a part here,
y does not have

that property.

But a difference in modal properties alone

is not reassuring.
(P9)

Coupled with the necessity to affirm

it becomes more attractive to deny that Maude exists

at all in

If Maude does not exist in w,

v;.

does not exist at t'.

then Maude

If we deny that Maude exists in w,

then we deny that Maude persists through

a

change in her

parts
A reconsideration o f an argument in Chapter
in Chapter

I

,

(A4)

.

Recall that

the problem of the Ship of Theseus was said

to present us with four possibilities.

argument

I

We discussed an

that asserted the falsity of the first three,

and so concluded that the fourth must be true.

Our recent

account of the Ordinary view attempts
to give credence to
opting for the first, namely, that
the ship that was crowned with garlands in 399 B.C.

ship.

is identical to the original

If our present argument,

(Al)

,

is right,

then we

must abandon that possibility.
The second possibility, namely that the
ship of the
Hobbesian man is identical to the original
ship, is subject
to the same difficulties.
We have seen that sharing a de-

composition is not sufficient for identity.

Now, we have

reason to doubt that the two ships do, in fact,
share
decomposition.

a

The planks, as proposed members of this

shared decomposition, surely fall under the umbrella of
(Al)

.

Since each of them has gained and lost parts during

the intervening period, we must doubt whether it has itself

persisted.

If so, we are loft with the fourth possibility,

namely, that neither later ship is identical to the original.

Of course, the remainder,

(A4)

where the truth of

the fourth possibility is seen to entail that physical ob-

jects don’t persist through changes in their parts, is extraneous.

If we accept the fourth possibility it is be-

cause we have come to realize that physical objects do not
so persist, and not the other way around.

The benefits of the Chisholm/Locke approach

.

Considera-

tions such as these lend credibility, if not strength, to
the attempts of philosophers such as Locke and Chisholm to
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give an alternative account of persistence.

Even the view

that Identity is relative gains a certain
attraction, since
a principle such as (P9) would not
trouble someone who believes that what I take to be one thing having
lots of

properties is in fact not one thing at all.
which

The table at

sit now shares every decomposition with the
desk

I

at which

I

sit now, though according to the proponent
of

relative ioentity

,

the table and the desk are not identi-

The theories presented by Chisholm and Locke, if we

cal.

suppose that the latter is not

identity

,

a

proponent of relative

were based on the assumption that real things

(composita or masses of matter) have their parts essential-

Perhaps we can now see more clearly the advantages of

ly.

making that assumption.
Locke and Chisholm fail to escape:
tion

.

a

Leibnizian specula-

Neither theory, however, works in detail.

It is

not even clear that they succeed in avoiding difficulties
as profound as the ones that appear to plague the Ordinary

View.

Chisholm replaces identity with relations like that

of table succession.

But one compositum or genuine whole

is a direct table successor to another only if they have a

part in common.

That part, then, must either strictly per-

sist or it must itself be a logical construction out of
some more basic things.

Chisholm's discussions always in-

volve, or seem to involve, the sort of change represented
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in Figure 5.

The table at

finitions worked,
t.

a

f

would be, if Chisholm's de-

direct table successor to the table at

They have parts in common.

Each of those parts, how-

ever, seems to be of the same ontological
status as the
table Itself, and so would be subject
to the same rules of

persistence (or non-persistence)
have parts.

.

The parts themselves

We are reminded of Leibniz' assertion that

"whatever has corporeal parts cannot fail to lose
some of
them at every moment.
if so, then the parts themselves
do not strictly persist.

logical constructions.

They must then themselves be
But if they are logical construc-

tions, what are they constructed upon?

It begins to look

as if we are on our way to a Leibnizian reduction.

if

Maude, for instance, does exist in w, or at t', then perhaps Maude is not a physical object at all.

Where we stand

.

Speculations such as these take us far

from the Ordinary View.

They even take us far from what

now appear relatively tame alternatives to the Ordinary
Viev7,

those of Locke and Chisholm.

It should come as no

surprise, however, to find that a solution to the problem
of persistence may lie in such redoubtable territory.

We

have seen, after all, that the problem is far deeper than
>•

we had originally thought it to be.

CHAPTER IV: ENDNOTES

Robert Coburn "The Persistence of Bodie
American Philosoohn na Quarterly 13 (July
1976)
pp. 173st:
,

^

9

“Coburn, p. 184.
3

p.

4

p-

Chisholm,

585.

582.

"Parts as Essential to Their Wholes,

Chisholm, "Parts as Essential to Their Wholes,

^Ibid.
g
7

Plantinga, "On Mereological Essentialism

,

"

p.

470.

Plantinga, p. 471.

g

The quantifiers in (PI)
and in the principles
that follow, range over physical objects.
,

9

I

owe this bit of terminology to Fred Feldman.

Chisholm, Person and Object
ing

,

p.

111.

“

Leibniz, New Essays Co ncerning Human Understand,

p.

247.
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